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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Federal Limitation of Liability Act v. State "Direct
Action" Statute
In 1851 Congress amended the law of admiralty of the United States
by the enactment of the Limitation of Liability Act' by which, in general, the liability of shipowners for loss or injury resulting from marine
accidents is limited by the value of the interest of the owner in the ship.
Prior to 1851 the rule of American law had been that the shipowner's
liability was limited only by the amount of the loss or by his ability
to pay the damages. 2 The United States was the last of the principal
western maritime powers to abandon the rule of unlimited liability.
While that rule had been part of the general English admirality law
(whence it came into American law), England had, by a series of acts
of Parliament beginning in 1734, adopted the principle of limitation.8
On the continent the rule of limited liability had, beginning with the
Code Napoleon, become an established part of the civil codes of all
maritime countries by the close of the Napoleonic era. 4 Thus, had Congress failed to act, American shipowners, required to bear the entire
burden of the cost of disasters at sea, would have been at a fatal disadvantage in competition with foreign powers for the privilege of carrying the waterborne commerce of the world.
The provisions of the act of 1851, so far as they are pertinent to this
discussion, have been amended only in minor particulars (with the
single exception noted below), and are now found as §§ 183 (a), 185
and 186 of the United States Code. 5 Briefly, the act provides that the
'Act Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 STAT. 635.
'Stinson v. Wyman, 23 Fed. Cas. 108 (D. Me. 1841). "The common law, as
well as the civil law, holds the owners responsible for all the obligations of the
master, to their full extent, whether they result from contract or tort." Id. at 109.
'English admiralty law was largely based on the Laws of Olron, an early
codification of the law of the sea taking its name from Ile d'Ol6ron, off the coast
of France. This code was published first in France in 1485, and was translated into
English during the reign of Henry VIII. The Laws of Ol6ron did not recognize
the principle of limited liability. See 4 BENEDICT, THE LAW oF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 352 (6th Ed. 1940-41).
'The law of admirality of continental countries was founded on the Consolato
del Mare, a code which was probably of Spanish origin and which was first published in Barcelona in 1494. See 4 BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADmIRALTY
353 (6th Ed. 1940-41). For a comprehensive review of the history of the rule
of limited liability, see The Rebecca, 20 Fed. Cas. 373 (D. Me. 1831).
'46 U. S. C. §§ 183 (a), 185, 186 (1952) : "183 (a). The liability of the owner of
any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction
by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of
such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred,
without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not . . . exceed
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liability of the shipowner for loss or injury may be limited by the value
of his interest in the ship and in the revenue from such freight as may
be involved in the voyage, provided that the loss or injury has occurred
without his knowledge or privity. Limitation proceedings in a federal
district court are authorized, to which shall be summoned all claimants,
and in which the owner is required to make available to the claimants,
pursuant to court order, the value of his interest in the ship and freight,
whereupon the court may enjoin all other actions against the owner
based on the same accident. Should the court, in this proceeding, find
knowledge or privity on the part of the owner, the petition for limitation
will be dismissed. Otherwise, the court causes the interest of the owner
in ship and freight to be appraised and the claims of claimants proved
and evaluated. If the aggregate amount of the allowable claims is not
in excess of the value of the owner's interest, each claimant receives his
claim in full. If the owner's interest is less than the total of the claims
allowed, each claimant receives a share pro rata.6
The constitutionality of the act was early established and has been
7
consistently upheld over the years.
Since 1886 the act has applied to every type of vessel whenever it is
operating on navigable water." While the act does not so state in terms,
the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel and her freight
then pending.
185. The vessel owner, within six months after a claimant shall have given
to or filed with such owner written notice of claim, may petition'a district court
of the United States of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability within the
provisions of this chapter, and the owner ( ) shall deposit with the court, for
the benefit of claimants, a sum equal to the amount or value of the interest of such
owner in the vessel and freight, or approved security therefor, and in addition such
sums, or approved security therefor, as the court may from time to time fix as
necessary to carry out the provisions of section 183 of this title, or (b) at his
option shall transfer, for the benefit of claimants, to a trustee to be appointed by
the court his interest in the vessel and freight, together with such sums or approved
security therefor, as the court may from time to time fix as necessary to carry
out the provisions of section 183 of this title. Upon compliance with the requirements of this section all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect
to the matter in question shall cease.
186. The charterer of any vessel, in case he shall man, victual, and navigate
such vessel at his own expense, or by his own procurement, shall be deemed the
owner of such vessel within the meaning of the provisions of this chapter relating
to the limitation of the liability of the owners of vessels; and such vessel, when so
chartered, shall be liable in the same manner as if navigated by the owner thereof."
' See Admiralty Rules of the Supreme Court, Rules 51-55.
'Wattson & Sons v. Marks et al., 2 Am. Law Reg. 157 (E. D. Pa. 1853);
Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541 (1880) ; Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co.
v. Hill Mfg. Cq., 109 U. S. 578 (1883); Butler v. Boston S. S. Co., 130 U. S.
527 (1889) ; it re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1 (1891).
8 As originally passed, it was provided that the act should not apply "to the
owner or owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter, or to any vessel of any
description whatsoever-used in rivers or inland navigation." An act of 1886
(c. 421, § 4) substituted the following provision: "The provisions of the six
preceding sections . . . shall apply to all sea-going vessels, and also to all vessels
used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and
lighters." 24 STAT. 80, 46 U. S. C. § 188 (1952).
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it has been held to apply to cases of personal injury or death as well as
to injury to or loss of property. 9 The interest of the owner in the ship
is measured by the value of the ship at the end of the voyage, after the
accident, even though the voyage ends in sinking, with resultant total
loss; furthermore, the owner is not required to account in the limitation
proceeding for the value or proceeds of any insurance he may have
10
carried on the vessel.
It is evident that the Limitation of Liability Act gives the shipowner
a pronounced advantage over the claimant for damages, including, of
course, the personal injury and wrongful death claimant. The reason
for that advantage was initially, and remains, established national policy
to encourge and protect investment in the shipping industry. That policy
is founded on the convction, long widely held, that a flourishing merchant
marine is both a vital element of national defense and an essential accessory to peace-time prosperity." But whatever the purpose has been,
the practical effect of the limitation act is to promote the interest of
the owner-defendant in a damage suit.
In marked contrast to the purpose of the federal act limiting the liability of shipowners, there began, some forty years ago, a movement on
the part of state legislatures to provide statutory protection for plaintiffs in damage actions for personal injury or wrongful death.1 2 One
of the most comprehensive of these laws was the so-called "direct action"
statute of Louisiana, enacted in 1930. This act provided that, regardless of contract provisions to the contrary, the plaintiff in a personal in' Butler v. Boston S. S. Co., 130 U. S. 527 (1889).
"0These rules were laid down first by the district court in Wattson & Sons
v. Marks et al., 2 Am. Law Reg. 157 (E. D. Pa. 1853). In respect to the time
when the value of the vessel was to be taken, the court reasoned that the owner,
in the limitation proceeding, was required to make available to the court his
interest in the vessel, and he could not then make available more than he had. If
the vessel were a total loss, the owner's interest, and his consequent liability, would
be reduced to zero. In reference to the problem of insurance, the court said:
"The policy of insurance is a distinct independent subject of property. No equity
attaches upon the proceeds of it in favor of third persons unless there be some
contract, agreement, or trust, to that effect. . . . The assignment of a ship
passes no interest in an outstanding policy. . .

."

Id. at 167.

The same conclusions were later arrived at by the Supreme Court. In respect
to the rule that the value of the ship is to be measured after the accident: Norwich
Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 104 (1871) ; The Scotland, 105 U. S.24 (1881).
In respect to the rule that the owner need not account for insurance proceeds:
Place v. Norwich & N. Y. Transportation Co., 118 U. S.468 (1886).

"1See

MAHAN. THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, ch. I (Boston,

Little, Brown & Co., 1895).
1" Massachusetts led the way in 1914 by passing a statute which permitted recovery by the injured plaintiff from the liability insurance carrier of the tort-feasor,
in case a judgment against the latter should be unsatisfied by reason of insolvency
or bankruptcy, notwithstanding a clause in the contract making the insurer liable
only for damages actually paid by the insured. Mass. Acts 1914, c. 464, §§ 1, 2;
MASS. GEN. LAws c. 175, §§ 112, 113; c. 214, § 3 (10) (1932). For a review
of state legislation in this field, see Legislation: Legislative Efforts to Make itn-

surance Guarantee the Payment of Tort Claims, 46 HARv. L. Rav. 1325; also
Leigh, Direct Actions Against Liability Insurers, INS. LAW J. 1949, p. 633.
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jury or wrongful death action might, at his option, sue the insurance
carrier of the alleged tort-feasor directly. The law was amended in
1950 to include liability contracts written by foreign insurance corn.panies and issued outside the state. 13 As originally passed, the act was
held to be constitutional by the Circuit Court of Appeals in .1931,14 and
as amended, by the Supreme Court in 195 4 .16
The theory underlying this legislation has been judicially declared
to be that a policy of liability insurance is issued primarily for the benefit of the public, not for the protection of the insured.' 6 In any individual action, the public obviously means the injured plaintiff. In addition to
giving the judgment creditor an action against the insurer of the insolvent or bankrupt tort-feasor (now a feature of the legislation of almost
every state), the Louisiana statute reverses the general rule of the
American law of evidence to the effect that testimony tending to show
that the defendant in a damage action is or is not insured is not admissible.17 Of course, the effectiveness of this rule is frequently nullified by permissible questions to jurors as to their connections with insurance companies, thus establishing the inference that an insurance
carrier is concerned in the case.' 8 Indeed, judicial notice has been
taken of the fact that jurors will assume that a defendant is insured. 19
The Louisiana statute replaces indirection and inference with direct
" As amended the act now appears as LA. REv. STAT. 22: 655 and 983 (E)
(1950). "655. No policy or contract of liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in this state, unless it contains provisions to the effect that the insolvency
or bankruptcy of the insured shall not release the insurer from the payment of
damages for injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the

policy ...
The injured person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have
the right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the
policy . . . . and said action may be brought against the insurer alone or against
both the insured and the insurer, jointly and in solido. This right of direct action
shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written and delivered
in the State of Louisiana or not, and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within
the State of Louisiana..
983 (E). No certificate of authority to do business in Louisiana shall be issued
to a foreign or alien liability insurer until such insurer shall consent to being sued
by the injured person or his or her heirs in a direct action as provided in Section

655 of this Title, whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not, and whether or not such policy contains

a provision forbidding such direct action, provided that the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana .... "
"'Hudson v. Georgia Casualty Co., 57 F. 2d 757 (W. D. La. 1932).
"Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954).
"°West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950); Davies
v. Consolidated Underwriters, 199 La. 459, 6 So. 2d 351 (1942).
1" Graves v. Harrington, 177 Okla. 448, 60 P. 2d 622
(1936); Kaplan et a[.
v. Loev, 327 Pa. 465, 194 AtI. 653 (1937) ; McLaughlin v. Shelton Auto Transportation Co., 139 Wash. 253, 246 Pac. 575 (1926). See also Beghtol, The Present
Rule Against Disclosure of Insurance, 15 NB. L. BULL. 327 (1936-37).
18 See Annotation, 105 A. L. R. 1319 (1936),
and cases cited thereunder.
Brown v. Walter, 62 F. 2d 798 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott, 179 Md. 249, 19 Atl. 2d 169 (1941); Odegard v. Connolly, 211 Minn. 342,
1 N..W. 2d 137 (1941).
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and open evidence of insurance. Thus, in theory at least, the balance is
in part adjusted between the impecunious and inexperienced plaintiff
and the wealthy corporate defendant with an imposing array of legal
talent at his call.
In Louisiana, with one of the important seaports of the country,
and many miles of navigable rivers, conflict between the direct action
statute of the state and the limitation of liability act of the United States
was almost inevitable. The conflict came about in 1951. In the previous
year the towboat, Jane S7mith, plying on the Atchafalaya River, had
struck the abutment of a bridge, capsized and sunk. Five members
of the crew were drowned. The owner and charterer 20 were covered
by public liability insurance in the aggregate amount of $180,000.21
Limitation proceedings were begun by the owner and charterer in the
federal district court of Louisiana, and in the same court at the same
time the representatives of the seamen who had lost their lives began
a consolidated action for damages against the insurance carriers under
22
the direct action statute.
The issues may be summarized (1) from the standpoint of the
owner and charterer, who, while not parties in the direct action, were
vitally interested in' the outcome; (2) from the standpoint of the insurance carriers; and (3) from the standpoint of the plaintiffs.
(1) It is evident that the owner and charterer purchased insurance
not to protect their employees or the families of deceased employees
(whatever the theory of liability insurance may be), but to protect themselves against liability in the event of an accident such as the one which
actually occurred; that they assumed that, absent their knowledge or
privity, their liability would be limited to the value of the vessel, and
that, therefore, the total insurance coverage need not exceed that value;
and that, since in the actual case the aggregate of the death claims exceeded $600,000, there was every likelihood that if the direct action
against the insurance carriers was permitted to proceed to judgment,
the whole of the insurance fund would be exhausted in satisfying such
judgment, so that in the limitation proceeding they would be denied
the insurance protection which they thought they had and for which
they had paid.
(2) In the direct action the insurers contended that the direct action
"' Neither owner nor charterer was a party to the direct action in this case;
they are identified only by the fact that both were citizens of the state of Louisiana.
" Maryland Casualty Co. had issued an employers' liability policy to the
charterer alone in the amount of $10,000; the Home Insurance Co. had issued a
"protection and indemnity" policy in the amount of $170,000, in which both the
owner
and charterer were named.
22 Cushing v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. et a[., 99 F. Supp. 681 (E. D.
La. 1951). The named defendant was the 6dner of the bridge; its interests are
not discussed in any of the opinions handed down in the case.
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statute did not apply to policies of marine insurance; that even if it
did so apply, it would be inoperative in this case as in conflict with the
federal limitation of liability act, and thus an infringement upon the
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) The plaintiffs insisted that the direct action statute was primarily a regulation of the business of insurance, enacted by the state in
conformity with authority specifically conferred by the McCarran Act ;23
that the purpose of liability insurance was to protect the public, and
that the direct action statute, in giving effect to that purpose, merely
gave an added remedy to the injured parties, without affecting the uniformity of substantive admiralty law or the rights of shipowners under
that law. It was pointed out that state legislation dealing, directly or
indirectly, with a variety of admiralty matters had been upheld by
the Supreme Court, 24 and that the Louisiana statute should not be
denied application because of its incidental effect upon the remedies of
parties in an admiralty case.
The district court rendered summary judgment for the defendants
and dismissed the action. The judgment was based on the conclusion
that the direct action statute did not apply to policies of marine in2' 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011, 1012 (1952). "1011. Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance

is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by
the several States.
1012 (a). The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business.
(li). No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."
This statute was passed to counteract the decision in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944), in Which it was held
that the business of insurance was commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, and that therefore, insofar as the insurance
business crossed state lines it was within the regulatory power of Congress.
"' 1 BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 79 (6th Ed. 1940-41). "In
the absence-of Congressional legislation, State legislation has been regarded in a
wide variety of instances as effective to create rights, to establish principles of
liability and even to create liens in rein enforceable in admiralty though not enforceable in State courts, which may not appropriate the distinctive character and
effect of an admiralty proceeding in ren." Among the instances referred to are:
a. Right of action for death by wrongful act committed on navigable water:
Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 522 (1872); Sherlock v. Alling,
93 U. S.99 (1876).
b. Municipal ordinances and local regulations respecting wharfage charges:
Keokuk Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 (1877); Parkersburg & Ohio River
Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 (1882); Ouachita Packet Co.
v. Aiken, 121 U. S.444 (1886).
c. Harbor pilotage regulations: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (53 U. S.)
299 (1851); Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 450 (1864).
d. Inspection and quarantine laws: Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of
Health, 118 U. S. 455 (1885) ; Compagnie Frangaise etc. v. State Board of Health,
186 U. S.380 (1901).
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surance, 25 and that if the state law were applied the rights of the owners
would be so materially affected through the substantial denial of the
proceeds of insurance that the purpose of Congress in passing the
limitation act would be frustrated. The conclusion was that the state
law interfered with a substantive admiralty right and was therefore inapplicable.
The Court of Appeals reversed. 26 That court held that since the
state law was remedial it should be construed liberally, and that while
the law made no specific reference to marine insurance it was proper to
presume that the legislature intended to include all types of liability
contracts. The court also relied on the provision of the United States
Code conferring admiralty jurisdiction upon district courts in "any
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. '27 On this
point the court conceded that the state may not legislate in the field of
substantive admiralty law, but insisted that the state had concurrent
jurisdiction in respect to the "other remedies" referred to in the Code.
"In no case has this court held void a state statute which neither modified
the substantive maritime law nor dealt with the remedies enforceable
in admiralty." 28 Finally, the court asserted that the federal act did not
relate to the business of insurance, and that while it precluded injured
parties from pursuing other remedies against the owner, it interposed
no bar to the pursuit of legally permitted remedies against others.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 29 The decision of the Court30
in this case is interesting, not only because of the judgment finally arrived at, but because of the method by which the Court reached its result.
There were two opposing opinions, one written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Burton, Mr. Justice Jackson,
and Mr. Justice Reed; the other by Mr. Justice Black, joined by the
Chief justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Minton. The Court
was thus arrayed with four members on one side and four on the
other. Mr. justice Clark wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part,
2

The direct action statute refers specifically to policies or contracts of liability

insurance. Liability and "maritime protection and indemnity insurance" are defined in separate sections of the insurance code (LA. REV. STAT. 22:6 (4) and (13)
(e) (1950). The court argued that since the legislature had differentiated liability from maritime insurance at one place in the Code, and in another had referred only to liability insurance, it must be presumed that in the latter instance
it was the intention of the legislature to omit maritime insurance.

20 Cushing et al. v. Maryland Casualty Co. et al., 198 F. 2d 536 (5th Cir.

1952).
27 28 U. S. C. § 1333 (1952).
28 198 F. 2d 536. 538. In referring to "remedies enforceable in admiralty" the
court has in mind characteristic admiralty proceedings in ren against the ship.
Such proceedings are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The
Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 411 (1866).
28345 U. S. 902 (1953).
20 Maryland Casualty Co. et al. v. Cushing et al., 347 U. S. 409 (1954).
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but dissenting in important particulars from the opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter. The latter justice and his colleagues accepted the divergent views of Mr. Justice Clark in order "to break the deadlock resulting from the differences of opinion within the Court and to enable
a majority to dispose of this litigation. ."...31This is certainly one of
the rare instances, if, indeed, it is not the only instance, in which the
process of arriving at a prevailing opinion, normally conducted by the
Court in the privacy of the conference room, has been spread upon the
record.
Mr. Justice Frankfurther would have reversed the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the judgment of the district court. In his view, the
McCarran Act could not be relied upon as a source of new state power,
because the purpose of that Act was not to confer new power, but to
confirm power already vested. In discussing the effect of the direct
action statute upon the limitation act, great stress was laid on the
function of the latter act in assembling at one time in a single forum
all those with claims against the shipowner. To quote the opinion:
"Direct actions against the liability underwriter of the shipowner or charterer would detract from the benefit of a concursus and undermine the operation of the congressional scheme
for the 'complete and just disposition of a many-cornered controversy.'3 2 * * * The ship's company would be subject to call as
witnesses in more than one proceeding, perhaps in diverse forums.
Conflicting judgments might result. Ultimate recoveries might
vary from the proportions contemplated by the statute. Moreover it is important to bear in mind that the concursus is not
solely for the benefit of the shipowner. The elaborate notice provisions of the Admiralty Rules are designed to protect injured
claimants. They ensure that all claimants, not just a favored few,
will come in on an equal footing to obtain a pro rata share of
their damages. To permit direct actions to drain away part or all
of the insurance proceeds prejudices the rights of those victims
who rely, and have every reason to rely, on the limitation pro'33
ceeding to present their claims.
The opinion expressed an equally positive conviction that the direct
action statute was in fatal conflict with the limitation act because
of the possible effect of the former on the insurance rights of the owner.
It was assumed that the value of the ship would be found to be $25,000,
"the amount for which we are advised a stipulation has been filed in
31

Id.at 423.

The quotation is from Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern
Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207, 216 (1926).
.3 347 U. S. 409, 416, 417.
"
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the limitation proceeding." 34 Should that prove to be the final figure,
the owner's insurance would be adequate to indemnify him for the loss.
This protection the direct action statute may well operate to destroy.
The opinion said:
"Thus, to permit direct actions under the State statute would
require that shipowners become self-insurers for liability risks in
order to be sure of getting the full protection of the limitation
legislation. In view of the fact that 'substantially all marine risks
are insured,'[35 1 . . . this sort of qualification would be completely
36
inconsistent with the Limitation Act."
As to the proper canons of construction of state legislation, this was

said:

11

"Of course, wholly apart from the respect to be accorded
State legislation, this Court would be slow to find that even
where Congress has exercised its legislative power it has not left
room for State action. * * * But where, as in this case, the
evident design of Congress can only be carried out by barring
' 7
State action, it must be barred."
As to the effect of the state law upon the uniformity of federal
admiralty law, the position was stated as follows:
"Of course, liability underwriters are not entitled to 'limitation
of liability' as that phrase is used as a term of art in admiralty.
To state the issue in these terms is to misconceive it. The question is whether the Court is to disregard the effect of a direct
action on the federal proceedings. The Louisiana statute, as applied to authorize suits against the insurers of shipowners and
charterers who have instituted limitation proceedings, is a disturbing intrusion by a State on the harmony and uniformity of
one aspect of maritime law. It is accentuated by the fact that
the federal law involved is not a more or less ill-defined area
of maritime common law, incursion upon which need not be here
considered, but an Act of Congress, well-defined and consciously
designed, with detailed rules for its execution established by this
Court."13

It will be noted that the opinion did not refer to the fact that here
liability insurance was involved, whereas in the leading case holding
*1Id. at 418.
"The quotation is from Keen v. Overseas Tanksbip Corp., 194 F. 2d 515, 518
(2d Cir. 1952).
-- 347 U. S. 409, 419.
37 Id. at 420.
38 Id. at 421, 422.
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that insurance need not be accounted for by the owner, the coverage in
issue was hull insurance. 39 Mr. Justice Frankfurter apparently viewed
the distinction as one not worthy of discussion. The district judge
had referred to the point, but it was held by him to be immaterial. 40
The opinion evidently gave some weight to the possibility that the
effect of the direct action statute would be to increase liability insurance
rates to shipowners. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black properly disposes of this point by noting that it was not the purpose of the
limitation act "to impose a ceiling on premiums.'
The question of
the cost of insurance protection does not seem to be relevant to the legal
issue.
Mr. justice Black's opinion was, in important particulars, curiously
unrelated to the other opinions in the case. Almost half of the opinion
was devoted to the argument that the direct action statute was not unconsitutional. Mr. Justice Frankfurter had not referred to the question of constitutionality; by inference the statute was assumed to be valid
except as to admiralty cases such as the one at bar.42
There was also revealed a strange misunderstanding as between Mr.
Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter as to the probable value of
the vessel. As noted, supra, p. 471, Mr. Justice Frankfurter assumed
that the value of the vessel would be $25,000. But in rejecting the
argument that the direct action statute would be inoperative because
it would deprive the owners of the benefit of their insurance, Mr. Justice
Black bad this to say:
"It was conceded at the bar, however, that the ship here is
without value-a total loss. If this is true, there would be no
fund in the limitation proceedings and no possibility of any recovery at all against the shipowner. Under these circumstances,
the shipowner does not stand to lose a dime if the insurance companies are held liable for the full amount of their policies, and
there is no reason for deferring trial of these lawsuits." 43
Obviously, the value of the vessel in this particular instance can have
no proper bearing upon the legal issue involved, whichever one of the
learned justices was right. The legal question was clearly joined, however, when Mr. Justice Black insisted that neither the Congress in
passing the limitation act nor the courts in construing it ever intended
"' Place v. Norwich & N. Y. Transportation Co., 118 U. S. 468 (1886).
"099 F. Supp. 681 (E. D. La. 1951).
"347 U. S. 409, 435.
42In Watson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954),
decided eight months later than the principal case, Mr. justice Black wrote the
leading opinion of a unanimous Court affirming the constitutionality of the
Louisiana statute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion.
1- 347 U. S. 409, 433, 434.
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to give the shipowner the benefit of liability insurance.
excerpt is pertinent to this point:

The following

"There is a vital difference between liability insurance and
hull insurance with which The City of Norwich 44 dealt. The
latter provides recovery for loss of the shipowner's property.
But liability insurance is not bought to guarantee reimbursement
for loss of a shipowner's property. Its purpose is to pay for
damage done to others by the shipowner or his agents. The
shipowner has an insurable 'interest' in his ship; if it is lost or
damaged any insurance money collected is his own. I cannot
believe he has an insurable 'interest' in his seamen which could
possibly entitle him to reduce the already limited financial obligations the Act imposes by taking for himself insurance money
which otherwise would go to compensate seamen or their families
It is a far cry from the decision in
for injuries he inflicts ....
The City of Norwich that a shipowner is entitled to keep the insurance collected for loss of his ship to today's holding that states
cannot assure seamen that they instead of the shipowner can get
the full benefit of liability policies bought in order to pay their
just claims for injuries caused by the ship."4 5
It is obvious that Mr. Justice Black assumed that liability insurance
is, in fact, and is intended by the shipowner to be, for the benefit of
seamen. It is also probable that the argument was based in part on the
doctrine that the seaman is the "ward of admiralty" and entitled to the
special and peculiar protection of the Court. 40 Whatever view one accepts in this particular case, it must be conceded that the effect of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's position in respect to liability insurance has resulted in a marked expansion of the insurance doctrine in limitation
cases.
The final point made by Mr. Justice Black was that the McCarran
Act substantially commands the application of the Louisiana statute.
On this point he said:
"Courts are pointedly told [by the McCarran Act] to leave
states free to regulate 'the business of insurance' in the absence
of some congressional act that 'specifically relates' to the same
subject. The 'business of insurance' includes maritime insurance
and by no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the 1851
Act 'specifically relates' to insurance. Thus the unambiguous
"118 U. S. 468 (1886).
347 U. S. 409, 434, 435.
'e See Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc.
et a., 317 U. S. 239 (1942).
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language of the McCarran Act forbids courts to construe federal
statutes such as the Limited Liability Act so as to impair a state
'47
law like Louisiana's. . . . I would not disregard its mandate.
But surely since the McCarran Act was passed for the specific purpose of preventing possible conflict between the states and the federal
government in the field of insurance regulation, it would be an unwarranted expansion of the meaning of the Act to hold that it mandates the
courts to sustain state insurance statutes which conflict with federal
admiralty jurisdiction.
It was Mr. Justice Clark who single-handedly made it possible for
the Court to render a judgment. In his opinion he agreed with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter that the direct action may not be permitted to
interfere with the progress of the limitation proceeding. But he argued
that, upon conclusion of the limitation proceeding, in which the claims of
the plaintiffs would be filed and proved, and the extent of the liability of
the owner and charterer determined, thus fixing the liability of the
insurers to owner and charterer, the direct action should then be allowed
to proceed against the insurers. Thus, if damages should be awarded
in the latter action, there would be available for their satisfaction the
balance of the insurance fund, not required to reimburse the owner
and charterer. 48 Mr. Justice Frankfurter and his associates adopted
as their own the solution of Mr. Justice Clark, who proposed that the
district court be directed "to first conclude the limitation proceeding,
after which the liability, if any, of the49 petitioners on their policies in the
direct actions could be determined.
This judgment established the shipowner as the preferred claimant
on the insurance fund; so long as his liability is less than the liability
of the inurer he will emerge without loss. But the injured plaintiffs
will not be wholly without redress if there is a balance of unused insurance. Certainly in the case of any major disaster, with material damage to, or loss of, the ship, the chance that the liability of the shipowner would exhaust the insurance fund is not as great as that the
damage actions would do so. Hence the likelihood that some recovery
would be available to the damage claimants is by no means inconsiderable.
The insurers can interpose no legal objection to this solution. It
is not their liability that is limited by the limitation proceeding. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out, "limitation of liability" is a phrase
"347 U. S. 409, 437.
"IThe principle set out in Mr. Justice Clark's opinion was stated by Circuit
Judge Rives, who, after concurring in the original decision of the Court of Appeals,
198 F. 2d 536 (5th Cir. 1952), changed his mind and dissented from the decision
denying a re-Hearing, 198 F. 2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1952).

"1347 U. S. 409, 427.
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of art in admiralty (supra, p. 472), and operates solely for the benefit
of the owner, not of his insurance carrier.
The result of this particular contest between plaintiff and defendant
in the arena of personal injury and death actions was an unquestioned
victory for the defendant-owner, but a limited measure of success was
reserved also for the plaintiff. It was an example of reasoned judicial
compromise, supported by the weight of both legal principal and common
sense. This can be said in spite of the almost fortuitous manner in which
the conclusion was reached.
As a practical matter, whatever advantage remains to the plaintiffs,
it may well be short-lived. If, as suggested, marine liability insurance
rates are increased, shipowners may decide to be self-insurers so far as
their public liability is concerned, on the theory that they can normally
make sure that they are free of the taint of "knowledge or privity." In
that case insurance on the hull would fully protect them in any limitation proceeding, and even Mr. justice Black has said that hull insurance
belongs to the owner, not to the damage claimants. It is, of course, too
early to say whether such a trend will develop in practice.
MILTON

E. Loomis.

Appeal and Error-Excluded Evidence on Cross-examination-Preservation for Appeal
It is a generally accepted rule that an exception to a ruling of a
trial court, complaining of an erroneous refusal to allow a witness to
answer a question, will not be considered on appeal where the record
does not set out what the answer of the witness would have been if he
had been permitted to testify, or what the interrogating counsel expected to elicit or prove by the question asked. 1 The reasons for the
1 Bridges v. Harold L. Schaefer, Inc., 207 Ark. 122, 179 S. W. 2d 176 (1944);
Swearingen v. Dill, 21 Cal. App. 2d 151, 68 P. 2d 388 (1937); Read v. Micek,
105 Colo. 35, 94 P. 2d 452 (1939) ; Gilpin v. State Highway Board, 39 Ga. App.
238, 146 S. E. 651 (1929) ; Whyte v. Rogers, 303 Ill.
App. 115, 24 N. E. 2d 745
(1940) ; Pearson v. Butts, 224 Iowa 376, 276 N. W. 65 (1937) ; Greenway Wood
Heel Co. v. John Shea Co., 313 Mass. 177, 46 N. W. 2d 746 (1943) ; Anderson
v. Anderson, 158 Miss. 116, 130 So. 91 (1930); State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Baumhoff, 230 Mo. App., 1030, 93 S. W. 2d 104 (1936); Gugelman
v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 137 Neb. 411, 289 N. W. 842 (1940) ; Whiteheart v. Grubbs, 232 N. C. 236, 60 S. E. 2d 101 (1950) ; Carolina Coach Co. v.
Central Motor Lines, 229 N. C. 650, 50 S. E. 2d 909 (1948) ; Newbern v. Hinton,
190 N. C. 108_, 111, 129 S. E. 181, 183 (1925) ("We are precluded from passing
upon the merits of the defendant's objections to the evidence, since the record does
not disclose what the witnesses would have said if the questions had been allowed.
The burden is on the appellant to show error, and, therefore, the record must show
the competency and materiality of the proposed evidence. This Court will not do
the vain thing to send a case back for a new trial when it does not appear what
the excluded evidence is, or even that the witnesses would respond to the questions in any way material to the issues. This is the established practice in this
Court, in both civil and criminal cases."); Wallace v. Barlow, 165 N. C. 676,
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rule are obvious. Unless such information is entered into the record
at the time, the trial court cannot tell how to rule on the objection
to the question propounded to the witness, 2 nor can the appellate court
ascertain the competency or materiality of the proposed testimony. If
on appeal it is found that the objection to the question was erroneously
sustained, the appellate court will be unable to determine if the exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial, justifying a reversal, for the
simple reason that the court will not have the rejected testimony before
it to see if such testimony would hate been favorable or unfavorable to
3

the excepting party.

Undoubtedly the general rule applies where a question is asked on
direct examination of a friendly witness.4 However, the matter of
preservation in the record of excluded testimony for purposes of appeal
presents problems when the answers are excluded on cross-examination
of an adversary's witness or examination of a hostile witness. Should
the general rule requiring that rejected evidence be perserved in the
record be applied in such situations?
Perhaps the most frequently employed method of preserving the
excluded testimony is for the excepting counsel to state to the court,
out of the hearing of the jury, the expected answer of the witness. 5
81 S. E. 924 (1914); Steeley v. Dare Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 27, 80 S. E. 963
(1914); it re Smith's Will, 163 N. C. 464, 79 S. E. 977 (1913) ; Dickerson v.
Dail, 159 N. C. 541, 75 S. E. 803 (1912) ; Stout v. V. C., S. & E. P. Turnpike
Co., 157 N. C. 366, 72 S. E. 993 (1911); State v. Leak, 156 N. C. 643, 72 S. E.
567 (1911); Whitmire v. Heath, 155 N. C. 304, 71 S. E. 313 (1911); Boney v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 155 N. C. 95, 71 S. E. 87 (1911); Cunningham v.
Austin & N. W. R. Co., 88 Tex. 534, 31 S.W. 629 (1895); Knapp v. Wing, 72
Vt. 334, 47 Atl. 1075 (1900) ; 4 C. J.S., Appeal and Error § 291 (b) (1) n. 44
(1937); 4 C. J., Appeal and Error § 1662 n. 14 (1916); 3 C. J., Appeal and
Error § 736 (bb) n. 53 (1916) ; 1 WIGMoRE, EViDENcE § 20 n. 6 (3d ed. 1940) ;
Blume, The Problem. of Preserving Excluded Evidence in the Appellate Record,
13 MINN. L. REv. 169 (1929).
2 Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382, 43 S.E. 712 (1903).
' Newbern v. Hinton, 190 N. C. 108, 129 S.E. 181 (192) ; State v. Lane, 166
N. C. 333, 337, 81 S.E. 620, 622 (1914) ("We must know what the answer would
have been before we can pass upon the competency or relevancy of the evidence.") ; Steeley v. Dare Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 27, 80 S.E. 963 (1914) ; Allred
v. Kirkman, 160 N. C. 392, 393, 76 S. E. 244 (1912) ("We must be governed by
the record in such case, and as it appears from it that the question was not
answered, there is no ground for the exception, an unanswered question not being
objectionable.") ; Whitmire v. Heath, 155 N. C. 304, 306, 71 S.E. 313, 314 (1911)
("A court can never pass intelligently upon the evidence unless it knows what the
evidence is, in order that its bearing upon the issue may be determined.").
'See note 1 supra.
"But ordinarily the exclusion of oral testimony can be made available as
error only by asking some pertinent question, and, if an objection is sustained,
informing the Court at the time what the answer would be, so that he can then
determine whether the fact is or is not material. It will not do to state thereafter
what the witness would have answered. . . . If a new trial should be granted
because the answer was excluded, it might happen that on the second trial the
question would be again propounded, allowed, and the witness give hearsay, inadmissible, or irrelevant testimony, or the answer might be harmful instead of
helpful, or the witness may reply, 'I do not know,' with the result that the time
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When this. method is employed, the trial court must rely on the good
faith of the interrogating counsel. 6 It is readily apparent that the
interrogating counsel cannot state as fully what the answer would have
been had the witness been allowed to testify where the question is asked
to an adverse or hostile witness, as he could if he were examining a
friendly witness introduced by himself.7 Counsel does not always know
on cross-examination what he expects to elicit from the witness in response to a particular question, since by its very nature, cross-examination is often exploratory. 8 Some courts have said that the application
of the general rule where a question is asked on cross-examination or
examination of a hostile witness requires counsel to hazard a guess as to
the probable answer of the witness or to deal with the court unfairly.0
Another reason advanced by some courts for allowing an exception
to the general rule in the case of cross-examination of an adversary's
witness or examination of a hostile witness is the fact that requiring
counsel to disclose the expected answer would often tend to hinder or
defeat the very purpose of the interrogation. The witness is apprised
of what counsel is attempting to elicit or prove by a series of questions.
If the witness is apprised of the expected answer, he is placed on guard
and can defeat the objective of the examination. This being the case,
the real value of cross-examination might be lost if such a disclosure
were required.' 0
and money of the parties and the country has been wasted for so inconsequent
a conclusion. That this is not unlikely to occur is shown by the experience of
all practising lawyers, who have often seen a long and heated argument as to
the right to ask a question, followed by the laughter of all bystanders when the
Court held it competent, and the witness replied that he knew nothing about the
matter. Parties can often agree in the presence of the Court as to what the
witness would testify, or,_ if not, the witness or examining attorney can state
what the answer would be; and, where the subject-matter is important, the
judge may, in his discretion, retire the jury until its admissibility has been settled.
We are well aware that the rule may be perverted into a means of getting inadmissible evidence before the jury, or, by forcing their constant withdrawal, retard
the trial. The Courts must rely upon the good faith of counsel not to bring about
such a result. But it would never do to grant a new trial until it appeared
not only that the question was proper, but that the answer was material, and
would have been of benefit to the complaining party." Griffin v. Henderson, 117
Ga. 382, 384, 43 S. E. 712, 713 (1903) ; Blume, The Problem of Preserving Excluded Evidence in the Appellate Record, 13 MINN. L. Rav. 169 (1929).
6 Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382, 43 S. E. 712 (1903).
Brock v. Cato, 75 Ga. App. 79, 42 S. E. 2d 174 (1947) ; Gilpin v. State Highway Board, 39 Ga. App. 238, 146 S. E. 651 (1929); Harness v. State, 57 Ind.
1 (1877) ; State v. Martino, 27 N. M. 1, 192 Pac. 507 (1920) ; Martin v. Elden,
32 Ohio St. 282 (1877) ; Burt v. State, 23 Ohio St. 384 (1872) ; Cunningham
v. Austin & -. W. R. Co., 88 Tex. 534, 31 S. W. 629 (1895).
'Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687 (1931) ; Costa v. Regents of University
of California, 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P. 2d 85 (1953) ; Tossman v. Newman,
37 Cal. 2d 522, 233 P. 2d 1 (1951).
' State v. Goodager, 56 Ore. 198, 106 Pac. 638 (1910), rehearing denied, 56
Ore. 261. 108 Pac. 185 (1910); Cunningham v. Austin & N. W. R. Co., 88 Tex.
534, 31 S. W. 629 (1895).
"'In re Powell, 83 Neb. 119, 119 N. W. 9 (1908) ; State v. Goodager, 56
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Because of these problems, the majority of the jurisdictions in the
United States have held that the general rule applies only to direct
examination of a friendly witness, allowing an exception in cases of crossexamination or examination of a hostile witness ;11 a minority of courts
2
have refused to make such an exception.1
Prior to 1936 the North Carolina Supreme Court specifically refused to recognize an exception to the general rule in the case of crossexamination of an adversary's witness or examination of a hostile witness.1 3 In 1936, the court, relying on the reasoning of a New Mexico
Ore. 198, 106 Pac. 638 (1910); rehearing denied, 56 Ore. 261, 108 Pac. 185
(1910); Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 47 At. 1075 (1900).
"Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687 (1931) ; California: Costa v. Re-

gents of University of California, 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P. 2d 85 (1953);

Tossman v. Newman, 37 Cal. 2d 522, 233 P. 2d 1 (1951).; Georgia: Griffin v.
Henderson, 117 Ga. 382, 43 S. E. 712 (1903) (leading case) ; Brock v. Cato, 75
Ga. App. 79, 42 S. E. 2d 174 (1947) ; Gilpin v. State Highway Board, 39 Ga.
App. 238, 146 S. E. 651 (1929) ; Hawaii: Choy v. Otaguro, 32 Hawaii 543 (1932) ;
Indiana: Hyland v. Milner, 99 Ind. 308 (1884); Hutts v. Hutts, 62 Ind. 214
(1878) ; Iowa: Schulte v. Ideal Food Products Co., 203 Iowa 676, 213 N. W.
431 (1927) ; Kansas: Leavens v. Hoover, 93 Kan. 661, 145 Pac. 887 (1915);
McIntosh v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Kan. 289, 131 Pac. 151 (1913) ; Massachusetts:
Grandell v. Short, 317 Mass. 605, 59 N. E. 2d 274 (1945) ; Michigan: O'Donnell
v. Segar, 25 Mich. 366 (1872); Miniesota: Uhlman v. Farm Stock & Home Co.,
126 Minn. 239, 148 N. W. 102 (1914); Montana: Loncar v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 84 Mont. 141, 274 Pac. 844 (1929); Howard v. Fraser, 83 Mont.
194, 271 Pac. 444 (1928); Nebraska: Larson v. Hafer, 105 Neb. 257, 179 N. W.
1013 (1920) ; In re Powell, 83 Neb. 119, 119 N. W. 9 (1908); New Mexico:
State v. Martino, 27 N. M. 1, 192 Pac. 507 (1920) ; Ohio: Martin v. Elden, 32
Ohio St. 282 (1877) ; Burt v. State, 23 Ohio St. 394 (1872) ; Oregon: Arthur
v. Parish, 150 Ore. 582, 47 P. 2d 682 (1935); State v. Goodager, 56 Ore. 198,
106 Pac. 638 (1910), rehearing denied, 56 Ore. 261, 108 Pac. 185 (1910) ; Texas:
Cunningham v. Austin & N. W. R. Co., 88 Tex. 534, 31 S. W. 629 (1895) ; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Currie, 91 S. W. 1100 (Tex. 1906) (exception to the
general rule was not allowed when a leading question was propounded on crossexamination because evidently counsel knew what he intended to elicit from the
witness) ; Vermont: State v. Parker, 104 Vt. 494, 162 Atl. 696 (1932) ; Knapp
v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 47 Atl. 1075 (1900) ; Washington: Le Doux v. Seattle
North Pacific Shipbuilders Co., 114 Wash. 632, 195 Pac. 1006 (1921). The exception to the general rule is also supported by Wigmore. 1 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE
§ 20 (3d ed. supp. 1953).
"2Birmingham Electric Co. v. McQueen, 253 Ala. 395, 44 So. 2d 598 (1947);
Flowers v. Graves, 220 Ala. 445, 125 So. 659 (1929) ; Williams v. State, 175
Ark. 752, 2 S. W. 2d 36 (1927); Munsell v. Yerger, 155 Ark. 385, 244 S. W.
465 (1922) ; Vale v. Illinois Pipe Line Co., 281 Ky. 1. 134 S. W. 2d 940 (1939) ;
Walker v. Rogers, 209 Ky. 619, 273 S. W. 439 (1925) ; Holladay v. Moore, 115
Va. 66, 78 S. E. 551 (1913); American Bonding & Trust Co. v. Milstead, 102
Va. 683, 691, 47 S. E. 853, 856 (1904) ("'Where a question is asked, and the
witness is not permitted to answer, the bill of exceptions must show what the
party offering the witness expected or proposed .to prove by him.' And the same
rule applies where a question is asked on cross-examination which the witness is
not permitted to answer."); Soules v. Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 19
N. D. 23, 120 N. W. 760 (1909).
, State v. Brewer, 202 N. C. 187, 162 S. E. 363 (1932) ; Steeley v. Dare Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 27, 80 S. E. 963 (1914) ; Stout v. V. C., S. & E. P. Turnpike
Co., 157 N. C. 366, 72 S. E. 993 (1911) ; State v. Leak, 156 N. C. 643, 72 S. E. 567
(1911).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

14

case, decided Etheridge v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company,'5
recognizing an exception where the question was asked a witness on
cross-examination or examination of a hostile witness. The court in the
Etheridge case stated:
"Upon examination, we have been unable to find in North
Carolina [a case], in applying the general rule, where the question was asked on cross-examination of an adversary and hostile
witness. The decision in the Martino case, supra, seems to be
the 'logic of the situation.' "16
The reason advanced by the court for the exception was the fact that
the interrogating counsel could not be expected to state to the court
what the witness would answer in such a case. This proposition was
followed in two later cases, 17 decided in 1936 and 1940 respectively.
However, in the interim, the court in 1939, without overruling or disapproving the previous cases which recognized the exception, refused
to allow an exception to the general rule where the question was asked
on cross-examination.' 8 Until the recent case of State v. Poolos,19 the
North Carolina position in regard to this matter was somewhat uncertain. In the last previous case in which the court discussed the
allowance of an exception where the question was asked on cross20
examination or examination of a hostile witness, State v. Wray,
decided in 1940, the court recognized the exception. However, in 1950
the court, without mention of the previous cases which allowed such
an exception, applied the general rule even though the question was
21
propounded to the witness on cross-examination.
1, "It is further to be noted that this witness was asked this question upon crossexamination, and counsel for appellant where not charged with knowledge of what
the answer of the witness would be. He was not appellant's witness. Counsel
for appellant, therefore, would not be expected to be able to state to the court
what the .witness would answer. Under such circumstances the rule requiring a
statement by counsel, advising the court of the nature of the testimony which the
witness would give, has no application." State v. Martino, 27 N. M. 1, 8, 192
Pac. 507, 509 (1920).
'r209 N. C. 326, 183 S. E. 539 (1936).
" Etheridge v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 209 N. C. 326, 332, 183 S. E. 539,
542 (1936).
"' State v. Wray, 217 N. C. 167, 7 S.E. 2d 468 (1940) ; State v. Huskins, 209
N. C. 727, 184 S.E. 840 (1936).
"liHammond v. Wiliams, 215. N. C. 657, 35 S.E. 2d 437 (1939).
19241 N. C. 382, 85 S. E. 2d 342 (1955) (Counsel for the defendant, crossexamining one of the State's witnesses, asked the witness if on one occasion she
had tried to commit suicide by eating bobby pins. The State's objection to the
question was sustained. Defendant's counsel merely excepted to the ruling and
assigned it as error. On appeal, the question was found to be a proper one for
the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, but the appellate court
refused to consider the exception because the record did not disclose what the
reply of the witness would have been if she had been allowed to testify.).
20 217 N. C. 167, 7 S.E. 2d 468 (1940).
" Whiteheart v. Grubbs, 232 N. C. 236, 60 S.E. 2d 101 (1950).
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The Poolos case disapproved the New Mexico case 2 and the previous
North Carolina cases2 3 which had recognized the exception, and refused
to accept as a valid reason for an exception in the case of cross-examination or examination or a hostile witness the fact that the interrogating
counsel could not be expected to state the expected answer.
"We do not think this reasoning is sound, for, after all, it is
not what the attorney knew or did not know that is determinative
of the question. Here, as in other similar situations, it is what
the witness would have said in response to the question, if she had
been permitted to answer, that would enable us to determine
whether the appellant was prejudiced by the ruling below." 24
Thus, all doubt is now removed as to the position of the North
Carolina courts. The rule may now be stated that when an objection is
sustained to a question propounded to a witness on either direct or crossexamination, and the record fails to show what the witness would have
answered had he been permitted to do so, the exception to the exclusion
of the testimony will not be considered on appeal. 25
In North Carolina, when an objection is made to a question asked
a witness, and there is some doubt as to the competency of the answer,
the trial judge should ask the interrogating counsel in the absence of
26
If
the jury, to state what he expected to prove by the question asked.
counsel does not show what he intended to prove by the proposed
testimony, an exception to an exclusion of the testimony will not be
considered by the appellate court.27 If the trial judge then sustains the
objection, excluding the testimony proposed to be elicited, the interrogating counsel must see that the testimony the witness would have
given, if he had been permitted to answer, is entered in the record by the
witness to the court stenographer outside of the hearing of the jury, in
order for an exception to the ruling to be considered on appeal. 28 This
practice meets all of the needs of the reviewing court.
22 See note 14 supra.
22 See notes 16 and 17 supra.
24 State v. Poolos, 241 N. C. 382, 384, 85 S. E. 2d 342, 343 (1955).
" State v. Poolos, 241 N. C. 382, 85 S. E. 2d 342 (1955).
"Hicks v. Hicks, 142 N. C. 231, 55 S. E. 106 (1906); STANSBTRY, NORTHr
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 27 (k) (1946).
27

Steeley v. Dare Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 27, 30, 80 S. E. 963, 964 (1914)

(" 'The general rule is that the party asking the question which is excluded must

disclose to the court what he expects to prove by the witness,' for the reason that
the court must be able to judge of the competency or materiality of the evidence
proposed to be elicited-not the counsel.") ; In re Smith's Will, 163 N. C. 464,
79 S. E. 977 (1913) ; State v. Leak, 156 N. C. 643, 72 S. E. 567 (1911) ; Boney
v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., 155 N. C. 95, 71 S. E. 87 (1911); Bernhardt v.
Dutton, 146 N. C. 206, 59 S. E. 651 (1907); STANSBuRy, NORaT CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 27 (k) (1946).
28

State v. Poolos, 241 N. C. 383, 85 S. E. 2d 342 (1955) ; Carolina Coach Co.

v. Central Motor Lines, 229 N. C. 650, 50 S. E. 2d 778 (1954) ; Snyder v. Asheboro, 182 N. C. 708, 710, 110 S. E. 84, 85 (1921) ("Since the record fails to dis-
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Itis submitted that the necessity of having the anticipated testimony
in the record in order to determine whether the exclusion was prejudicial
outweighs the reasons advanced for allowing an exception to the general
rule where a question is asked on cross-examination or examination of
a hostile witness. The Poolos case is in accord with the accepted practice in this jurisdiction as it prevailed prior to 1936 and to this writer
represents the sounder view.
GEORGE M. BRIr-r.
Constitutional Law-Use of the Police Power for the Attainment of
Aesthetic Considerations
In the recent case of Berman v.Parker' the Supreme Court decided
that the appellant was not deprived of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by the condemnation of his private property for aesthetic considerations by the exercise of the police
power of Congress delegated to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency. The condemnation was made under the authority
of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, D. C. Code
§§ 5-701 to 5-719 (1951), hereinafter referred to by section number.
The general purpose of the statute as set out in § 5-701 is "to eliminate the substandard housing conditions and the communities in the inhabited alleys and blighted areas" in the District of Columbia by acquiring the property through gift, purchase, or the use of eminent domain.
This act empowers the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land
Agency, hereinafter called the Agency, to acquire and assemble real
property in order to "further the redevelopment of blighted territory
in the District of Columbia by the prevention, reduction, or elimiiiation
of blighting factors or causes of blight."2 (Emphasis added) The
Agency, once such property is assembled, then has the power, in accordance with the plan of the District of Columbia Planning Commission, to transfer to the District or to the United States all property to be
devoted to public uses, and to lease or sell the remainder to private
individuals or corporations to redevelop in accordance with the plan
of the commission.
Under the definition of "redevelopment" given in § 5-702 (n) of the
Act, the redeveloper would have the power to replan, clear, redesign,
and rebuild the project area. This would seem to include totally
close what the witness would have said, we cannot assume that his answer would
have been favorable to the defendant. It would be vain to grant a new trial upon
the hazard of an uncertain answer by the witness.") ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDEN E § 29 (b) (1946).
175 Sup. Ct. 98 (1954).
2

D. C. CODE § 5-703 (1951).

1955]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

changing the area, including street layouts, to suit the needs and
purposes of the redevelopment. 3
Although § 5-702 of the Act is devoted to defining terms used in the
Act, it is alarming to note that the term "blighted area," which is used
so freely in the Act to describe the type areas the Agency is to take
over and cause to be redeveloped, is not defined. The term "substandard housing conditions" is the only defined term which in anyway
describes the type of condition which the Agency is to eliminate. This
term is defined as "conditions obtaining in connection with the existence
of any dwelling, or dwellings, or housing accommodations for human
beings, which because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light,
or because of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or
any combination of these factors, is in the opinion of the commissioners
detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants
of the District of Columbia."' 4 This would seem to refer exclusively to
dwellings of one type or another.
The particular area in which the appellant's property is located is a
fifteen-block-square area in the city of Washington in which slum 5 conditions are said to exist. The western boundary is an irregular line
which includes some establishments along a street and excludes others
on the same side of the same street. It is on this boundary that the
6
appellant's property lies.
No acute housing shortage is to be met; no more residents than presently reside in the area are to be provided for, according to the commission's plan; and no rearrangement of the streets is planned. The
plan provides that certain streets be widened somewhat and that an
expressway and a greenway be built. This would, of course, be a legitimate exercise of eminent domain, and such property would be conveyed
to the District.7 However, the plan does not call for the appellant's
property to be used for the greenway or expressway. His property is to
ID. C. CODE § 5-702 (n) (1951): "'Redevelopment' means replanning, clearance, redesign, and rebuilding of project areas, including open-space types of
uses, such as streets, recreation and other public grounds, and spaces around
buildings, as well as buildings, structures, and improvements, but not excluding the
continuance of some of the existing buildings or uses in a project area. For the
purposes of sections 5-701 to 5-719, 'redevelopment' also includes the replanning,
redesign, and original development of undeveloped areas which, by reason of
street lay-out, lot lay-out, or other causes, are backward and stagnant and therefore blighted and for which replanning and land assembly are deemed necessary
as a condition of sound development."
'D. C. CoDE § 5-702 (r)(1951).
'The word "slum" meaning conditions injurious to public health, safety, morals,
and welfare. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 723 (D. D. C.
1953).
' These facts were gleaned from the District Court opinion, Schneider v.
District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 723, et seq. (D. D. C. 1953).
D. C. CODE § 5-706 (a) (1951).
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be sold to private individuals for redevelopment and private use in accordance with the plan.
The question arises as to why the appellant's property should be
taken at all. The Court admits that this is not a taking of private property for slum clearance, an accepted public use in eminent domain, but is
taking "a man's property merely to develop a better balanced, more attractive community."'8 The Court then concludes that the latter is a
proper "public use," justified on the grounds that if the purpose of the
legislation is within the police power, it may also be a public purpose
in eminent domain. However, it is not claimed that the building is
dilapidated or unsafe or in any way detrimental to the public health,
safety, or morals. The inference is that the appellant's property, with
its department store, constitutes a "blighted area." What factor concerning the appellant's building causes it to be a blight is uncertain since
the term is nowhere defined in D. C. Code §§ 5-701 to 5-719. The
only hint as to the meaning to this word is found in § 5-702 (n) : " ' fR]edevelopment' also includes the replanning, redesign, and original development of undeveloped areas which, by reason of street layout, lot
layout, or other causes, are backward and stagnant and therefore
blighted. . . ." (Emphasis added) It would seem, therefore, that
a blighted area could be almost anything the Agency wanted to designate as such, or could extend as far beyond a substandard housing condition as the Agency should wish to extend it.
The real purpose for taking the property appears to be for aesthetic
considerations; that is, though the appellant's property cannot be classified as unsafe, unhealthy, or immoral, the public welfare seems to demand that buildings be pleasing to the eye as well as safe and sanitary
and that they fit in with the latest architectural whim of the city fathers.
This appears to be the Court's concept as it says: "The concept of the
public welfare is broad and inclusive. * * * The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that a community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled." 9 This raises the question:
Should the police power be used for aesthetic purposes?
This question has been raised before in connection with the regulation of outdoor advertising and in the case of the zoning laws. Massachusetts decided in 1935 that neither the Massachusetts nor the Federal
Constitution guarantees a land owner the right to maintain a sign on his
land in such a manner as to impair the beauty of public buildings, or
'Berman v. Parker, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 102 (1954).
'Id. at 102, 103.
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grounds, or natural scenery. 0 It has been pointed out that the issue
raised by the restriction of billboard advertising is that of the right to
accost citizens by visual solicitation and is a refinement of the law of
assault; while the issue raised by the attempted regulation of the sightliness of buildings stems from the conception of nuisance at the common
law." The Massachusetts court in General Outdoor Advertising Co.
v. Dept. of Public Works'12 reaffirmed what had been said in Opinion
of the Justices: "It has been decided quite generally, if not universally
in the courts in which the question has been raised, that aesthetic considerations alone or as the main end do not afford sufficient foundation
for imposing limitations upon the use of property under the police
power,"' 3 and went further to say that if the primary and substantive
purpose of the act was such as to justify it, aesthetic considerations might
enter as an auxiliary factor.
With the decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.14 and
the holding by the Court that general zoning ordinances are constitutional, there has been an upsurge in zoning litigation, and the question of aesthetic considerations as a basis for zoning regulations has been
considered a number of times.
Massachusetts and Virginia seem to follow the principle suggested
in the Outdoor Advertising case, 15 and while not allowing aesthetic
considerations to be a basis for zoning regulation of private property,
they are regarded as a factor which may not be disregarded. 16 Other
jurisdictions in which the question has been raised have not laid much
emphasis on the necessity of consideration of the aesthetic side of the
matter. However, all seem to agree that aesthetic considerations alon6
may not be the basis for zoning regulations.' 7
This question of the taking of private property by the state for
aesthetic considerations has been raised in North Carolina only on three
"oGeneral Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass.
149, 193 N. E. 799 (1935).
"Gardner, The Massachusetts Billboard Decision, 49 HARv. L. Rlv. 869, 882
(1936).
12289 Mass. 149, 184, 185, 193 N. E. 799, 815 (1935).
13234 Mass. 597, 604, 127 N. E. 525, 528 (1920).

U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926) ; noted in 5 N. C. L. REv. 237 (1927).
" General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149,
184, 185, 193 N.E. 799, 815 (1935).
" Barney and Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87 N. E. 2d 9
(1950) ; West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
' Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, 58 F. 2d 593
(8th Cir. 1932); Papaioanu v. Commissioners of Reholoth, 25 D el. Ch. 327, 20
A. 2d 447 (1941) ; Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of-Chicago, 408 Ill.
91, 96 N. E.
2d 499 (1951) ; Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill.
275, 43 N. E. 2d 947 (1942) ;
Hichman v. Oakland Township, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N. W. 2d 306 (1951); City
of Scotsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 155 Neb. 723, 53 N. W. 2d 543 (1952) ;
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N. E. 2d
440 (1952), appeal dismissed 158 Ohio St. 258, 108 N. E. 2d 679 (1952) ; Niday
v. City of Belaire, 251 S. W. 2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
14272
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occasions. In Yarborough v. The North Carolina Park Commission'8
it was decided that private property might be taken by eminent domain
even for aesthetic purposes if for a public use. The court here is referring to the taking of land to create state parks, thereby preserving
the scenic beauty of the state. It is doubtful that this case would support the taking of property on which there was a building which did not
constitute a hazard to the public safety, health, morals or welfare, and
selling that property to a third party for his private use. In MacRae
v. Fayetteville, 9 an attempt was made to enforce an ordinance prohibiting building a service station within 250 feet of a residence within
the corporate limits of Fayetteville. The court held that "the law does
not allow aesthetic taste to control private property, under the guise of
police power." 20 The court in a later case, deciding that an ordinance
restricting the height of walls in the city of Greensboro was valid, said:
"[W]hile esthetic considerations are by no means controlling, it is not
in determining the reasonableinappropriate to give some weight to them
'21
consideration."
under
law
the
of
ness
The Court in allowing the police power to be used for aesthetic considerations seems to be leaving the door open to many abuses. This
decision will undoubtedly lead to a great deal more litigation before it is
finally determined, if ever, just what aesthetic considerations will be
allowed.
PAUL B. GUTHERY, JR.

Constitutional Law-Validity of Adoption Statute-Requirements
Concerning Religion of Child and Adoptive Parents
A recent Massachusetts case, Petitions of Goldman,' upheld the
constitutional validity of a statute2 which said that whenever practicable,
the judge in making orders for adoption, "must give custody only to
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child." In the prinIs 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928).
"198 N. C. 51, 150 S.E. 810 (1929).
20 Id. at 54, 150 S.E. at 812.
1In

re Appeal of Parker, 214 N. C. 51, 57, 197 S. E. 706, 710 (1938) ; appeal

dimnissed, Parker v.City of Greensboro, N. C., 305 U. S.568, 59 S.Ct. 150 (1938).
'- Mass. -, 121 N. E. 2d 843 (1954) ; cert: denied, 348 U. S. 942 (1955).

This case might have been appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to 62

STAT.

929 (1948), 28 U. S.C. § 1257 (1953).

MASS.ANN. LAWS c.210, § 5B (Supp.1953) :"Inmaking orders for adoption,
the judge when practicable must give custody only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. In the event that there is a dispute as to the
2

religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed to be that of its mother.
"If the court, with due regard for the religion of the child, shall nevertheless

grant the petition for adoption of a child proffered by a person or persons of a
religious faith or persuasion other than that of the child, the court shall state
the facts which impelled it to make such a disposition and such statement shall
be made part of the minutes of the proceedings."
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cipal case the lower court found that the petitioners, who were Jewish,
were morally and financially qualified to bring up the twins, whose
mother and "natural father" were Catholic. The court also found that
there were many fine Catholic families in the area who had filed applications for adoption with the Catholic Charities Bureau. Therefore, the
court affirmed the dismissal of the petitions on the grounds that it was
practicable, within the meaning of the statute, to grant the custody of
the children only to persons of the Catholic faith.
The subject matter of this note is confined largely to the constitutional aspects of this problem under the Constitution of the United
States. 3 It is now well settled law that the religious guaranties contained in the First Amendment 4 are incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
The court in the Goldman case held that the statute in question did
not effect an establishment of a religion as all religions were treated
alike, no sect was subordinated to another, no burden was placed on any
religion for the maintenance of another, nor was the exercise of religion
required. To the argument that the statute interfered with the mother's
constitutional right to determine her children's religion 6 the court said:
"she seems to have consented rather than commanded and seems to have
'been interested only that the babies were in a good home' . . ." and

concluded that there was clearly no interference with the mother's wish
so long as she retained her status as a parent.
It is a well recognized principle that parents have a fundamental
right to rear their children in a particular religious faith. 7 However,
there are certain limitations on the free exercise of religion in this area.
Thus where a child distributed religious literature in violation of a
child labor statute;8 where a father sent his child to a private school
which had no secular instruction ;9 or where a parent, for religious
ISee Note, 54 COL. L.

Rv.376

(1954) for a thorough and detailed analysis

of the cases and statutes relating to religion as a factor in adoption, guardianship

and custody.

""Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." U. S.

CONsT. AMEND. I.
' "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law....." U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Hamilton v. Regents,

293 U. S.245 (1934).
' Petitions of Goldman, - Mass. -, -, 121 N. E. 2d 843, 846 (1954). The
children were born in a hospital from which the petitioners took them. The
mother of the twins never saw the petitioners, but she knew they were Jewish.
The mother gave her written consent to the adoption prayed for.
7
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 167 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.510, 534 (1925) ; Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 857, 85
N.Y.S. 2d, 682, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
8 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S.158 (1943).
'Shapiro v. Dorin, 199 Misc. 643, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Dom. Rel. 1950). The
only subjects taught to the children were the Bible, the Talmud, and elementary.
Jewish law.
, ,
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reasons, refused to provide his child with medical necessities,' 0 the
states have intervened to protect the child's welfare.
In the foregoing cases, the court felt that state intervention was
necessary to protect the child's welfare. It is submitted that in the instant case, the mother's consent to the adoption of the twins by persons
of a different religious faith was not the type of parental action which
so affected the children's welfare as to warrant the intervention by the
state under its police power."
The second aspect of this problem deals with the "establishment
of religion" clause of the First Amendment which the Supreme Court
has said means at least this:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which will aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious or2
ganizations or groups and vice versa."'
Thus, a state may not permit religious teachers of various faiths to
use its classrooms, during school hours, to teach religion to children
who are compelled by law to attend school;13 nor may the state condition probation of a delinquent child on church attendance,' 4 because "the
First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State which
must be kept high and impregnable."' 5
However, government need not be hostile to religion. Thus, it has
been held constitutional for a state to reimburse parents of public,
private, and parochial school children for bus transportation to and from
school;16 to release children from public school to attend religious in"0People v. Pierce, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903) (criminal prosecution
against a member of the Christian Science faith for not -providing necessary medical treatment of his minor daughter).
"See PFEFFRr,
CHURCH, STATE AND FaEzom 587 (Boston: Beacon Press,
1953).
'23Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1946).
" McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
"Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 355, 38 S. E. 2d 444 (1946).
' McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948).
" Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1946). The Court held that
the statute did no more than to provide a program for getting all children, regardless of religion, safely to and from schools.
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structions in their various faiths off school property ;17 and to permit
the reading of verses from the Old Testament and the reciting of the
Lord's Prayer to public school children for the purpose of teaching them
piety, justice, and truth.' 8
It is submitted that religion should be one of the factors taken into
consideration in the determination of whether a particular person may
adopt a particular child. If the child has reached the age where he has
become aware of religion and religious differences, his welfare, which
should be protected by the state, demands that a conflicting religious
doctrine not be imposed by adoption. Clearly this would not effect the
establishment of a religion, because all religions would be treated alike.
However, if, as in the Goldman case, the child has not reached the age
of religious awareness, it would seem that little or no emphasis should
be placed on the religious aspect of the child's welfare.19 In the principal case the court held that even though the children had not been
baptized 20 and were too young to choose a religion, their religion was
21
Catholic.
17 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) ; Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 857,
85 N. Y. S. 2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
" Doremus v. Board of Education, 7 N.J. Super. 442, 71 A. 2d 732 (1950),
aff'd,0 In
5 N.
435, 75 case
A. 2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U. S. 429 (1952).
the J.Goldman
the court said: "The petitioners have dark complexions
and dark hair. The twins are blond, with large blue eyes and flaxen hair." Petitions of Goldman, - Mass. -, -, 121 N. E. 2d. 843, 844 (1954). It might be
argued that because of the difference in physical characteristics, it would be in the
best interest of the children that they be adopted by parents with similar characteristics. On the other hand, there is a good argument against taking the
twins away from the petitioners after the twins had been in the petitioners' home
for three years.
"' "A custom has grown up that where a child is once baptized or entered
in any prescribed manner into a church, that the child is to be treated as belonging to that churcTi so l6ng as he is a minor. There is no foundation in law
for such a position. The English cases have held that it is for the father to determine the religious education of a child during his minority. American law
generally * * * recognzes both parents as joint guardans of their children. Where
they agree as to the religious education of their children, no question arises, even
if such agreement includes a change of adherence from one religion to another
during the child's minority. * * * The rights of parents in regard to their minor
children has long been recognized, but there is no right in any church to compel
continued adherence. Where the parents disagree as to the religious education of
their children, the court must consider not only whether there was an admission
of the child to any church, but the entire situation. It is important to discover
whether there was an antenuptial agreement, whether the child's admission to the
church was with the knowledge and consent of both parents, the extent to which
the child has received any form of religious education, whether the child has
reached years of discretion and, if so, what preference the child feels * * * and
finally in which environment the particular child is most likely to develop fully
and happily." It re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N. Y. Supp. 355, 359 (1936).
The stress placed upon baptism raises a possibles constitutional objection
in that it tends to "favor claims of custody of children by adherents of those religions in which faith is determined by baptism as compared with those which
view the child's faith as purely derivative until the child is able to understand
and accept church doctrines." Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 694, 695 (1952).
"1It will be recalled that the statute in question said-: "In the event that there
is a dispute as to the religion of the child, its religion shall be deemed to be that
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the statute in question does not
violate the constitutional prohibition against the establishment of religion. However, it would seem that, in the instant case, the statute
interferes with the mother's constitutional right to determine her children's religion and that the state should not be allowed to assert that
the welfare of the twins necessitated state interference with that religious liberty.
HRBERT S. FALK, JR.
Contempt of Court-Failure to Comply With Court Order to Produce Properties-Inability as Defense
When an individual has failed to comply with a court order requiring him to produce properties, and the court seeks to hold him in
contempt, will his professed inability to obey the court order purge him
of this contempt? Such a case was recently before the North Carolina
Supreme Court, involving an appellant who had been ordered to produce the records of his grocery business. He explained that he was
unable to obey the court order since the only records he ever prepared
were income tax returns which he no longer possessed, and cash register
receipts which he threw away after rats had gnawed them. The Supreme
Court held the appellant had been improperly cited for contempt since
his uncontradicted testimony showed that he was unable to comply with
the trial court's order.'
It is generally held that a contemner's inability to comply with a
court order is sufficient to purge him of contempt, if he is without fault,
but it is often added that the contemner's inability is no defense where
caused by his own "contumacious" acts. 2 The general rule seems quite
of its mother." (Emphasis added) The court said: "We do not attempt to discuss the philosophy underlying the concept that a child too young to understand
any religion, even imperfectly, nevertheless may have a religion. We have no
doubt that the statute was intended to apply to such children, and that in such
instances the words 'religious faith * * * of the child' mean the religious faith
of the parents, or in case of 'dispute' the faith of the mother." Petitions of Goldman, - Mass. -, -, 121 N. E. 2d 843, 846 (1954).
1 Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 84 S. E. 2d 822 (1954). This able opinion
by Mr. Justice Johnson, after defining direct and indirect criminal and civil
contempts, restates the necessity of an order to show cause in all contempt proceedings except those for direct criminal contempts.
2 Tucker v. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General, 299 Ky. 820, 827, 187
S. W. 2d 291, 294 (1945) : "Defendants [contemners] are correct and are sustained
by authorities cited that the inability of the contemner, without fault on his own
part, to obey the order holding him in contempt is sufficient to purge him of the
contempt charged. 12 Am. Jur. § 72, p. 438 (1938); Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky.
400. 214 S. W. 791; Allen v. Woodward, 111 Tex. 457, 239 S. W. 602, 22 A. L. R.
1253. But where the contemner 'has voluntarily or contumaciously brought on
himself disability to obey an order or decree, he cannot avail himself of a plea
of inability to obey as a defense to a charge of contempt."' Accord: McCormick
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inclusive, but cases interpreting the contemner's "fault" or "contumacious" acts reveal that these are important exceptions.
The contemner's "fault" has been made his plea of inability to comply with a court order unavailing not only where his inability was the
result of "fraud or sharp practice,"'3 but also where he acted negligently.
Thus the courts hold in contempt the innocent fiduciary who fails to
produce trust funds in obedience to a court order, although he is unable
to comply because he negligently made an improper distribution of the
funds, 4 explaining that the law imposes a special duty on the fiduciary
that magnifies his negligence. 5 Even in the absence of any relationship
of confidence or trust an individual has been held in contempt where
his inability resulted from his failure to exercise "due diligence. ' 6 However, this does not appear to be a majority view. "Contumacious" acts
are equated with action voluntarily bringing about the contemner's
disability to comply with a court order 7as where neither a police officer
nor a club owner could explain how slot machines disappeared from
their custody s and, of course, inability so caused is no defense in contempt proceedings based on a failure to comply with the order.
In the North Carolina case of In re Haywood," a trial court ordered
an- attorney to turn over funds to his client which he had admittedly received for the client, but upon the lawyer's affidavit that he was totally
insolvent, explaining that he had been "mad drunk" for eighteen months
v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 67 Nev. 318, 218 P. 2d 939 (1950) ; Bradshaw v.
Bradshaw, 23 Tenn. App. 359, 133 S. W. 2d 617 (1939).
For statement of the rule without mention of any exceptions as to the contemner's fault or "contumacious" acts, see: U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950)
Armijo v. Armijo, 29 N. M. 15, 217 Pac. 623 (1923). '
For an application of the rule absent contemner's fault or "contumacious" acts,
see In re Scarborough Will, 139 N. C. 423, 51 S. E. 931 (1905), where the contemner purged himself of contempt for failure to comply with a court order to
produce a will by proving that the will was in the hands of a judicial officer who
would not turn it over to the contemner.
'See Maglich v. Maglich, 61 N. E. 2d 507, 508 (Ohio 1945).
'Society of the Divine Word v. Martin, 240 Idaho 1084, ,38 N. W. 2d 619
(1949) ; Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 214 S. W. 791 (1919) ; Messmore's Estate,
293 Pa. 63, 141 Atl. 724 (1928).
Messmore's Estate, 293 Pa. 63, 69, 141 At1. 724, 726 (1928) : "Although not
charged with fraud arising malo animo, appellant [contemner] is guilty of maladministration of trust funds, and this is a species of fraud. He is, therefore, not
in the position of one who pleads inability to pay because of poverty which came
upon him through no fault of his own. The law is not lenient to those in the
position of the appellant .... "
' Bro~wn v. Clark, 260 P. 2d 544, 547 (Utah 1953) (Inability to produce a
child placed in the contemner's custody resulted when the contemner negligently
allowed the child's father to take him from the contemner.). It is elsewhere stated
that the contemner's inability must not be caused by "his own neglect or misconduct." Hembree v. Hembree, 208 Ky. 658, 660, 271 S. W. 1100, 1101 (1925).
" See quotation from Tucker v. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General, 299
K Ky820,
827,v. 187
S. W. 2d 291, 294 (1945), footnote 2 supra.
Tucker
Commonwealth
ex rel. Attorney General, 299 Ky. 820, 187 S. W. 2d
291 (1945).
966 N. C. 1 (1872).
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and didn't know what had happened to the money-except that he had
not applied it to his own use, the court held he could not be adjudged
in contempt for failing to deliver these funds to his client. Although
the North Carolina Supreme Court has not spelled out what "fault"
and "contumacious" acts causing the contemner's inability will defeat
his plea of inability, it can be assumed that the law forbids a contemner
to render himself unable to obey a court order by fraudulent conduct.
Therefore, it logically follows from the Haywood case that in North
Carolina a plea of inability is a complete defense unless caused by fraud,
when proved to the court's satisfaction. Quaere whether the court would
take such an extreme view if presently faced with a case involving gross
misconduct.
Where the contemner raises his inability in defense to contempt proceedings, it is sometimes held that the contempt order must specifically
answer this plea by finding that the contemner wrongfully or "contumaciously" made himself unable to comply with the court order. 10
Once the court has evidence before it showing a court order, as
well as the contemner's failure to comply with it and the contemner's
plea of inability, according to the weight of authority the burden of
proof is on the contemner." Other jurisdictions reach much the same
2
result by saying the complainant has thus established a prima facie case.1
Alabama is a notable exception to this outlook since its courts have indicated that the burden of proof is on the complainant in this fact situation. 13 Similarly, the burden of proof is always on the complainant
in the Oregon courts, but proof of the court order and failure to comply
with it is said to make a prima facie case which throws upon the contemner the burden of going forward with the evidence.14
10 White v. Adolph, 305 I1. App. 76, 80, 26 N. E.o 2d 993, 994 (1940) : "We
believe, therefore, that while it may have been perfectly proper for the court to
find the appellant [contemner] guilty of contempt, before he could imprison the
appellant, he should have found that such a failure to pay amounted to a wilful
and contumacious refusal to obey the order of the court." Accord: Adams v.
Rakowski, 319 Ill: App. 556, 49 N. E. 2d 733 (1943). See Maglich v. Maglich,
61 N.E. 2d 504, 508 (Ohio 1945).
"Wilson v. Wilson, 45 N.M. 224, 229, 114 P. 2d 737, 740 (1941): "'The
burden . . . was upon the appellant [contemner] to affirmatively show his inability
to make the payments required of him.' The almost universal rule is to this
effect." Accord: Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 192 So. 466 (1939) ; Lusty v. Lusty,
70 Idaho 382, 219 P. 2d 280 (1950); Hays v. Hays, 216 Ind. 62, 22 N. E. 2d
971 (1939); Meisner iv. Meisner, 220 Minn. 559, 20 N. W. 2d 486 (1945);
McCormick v. Sixth Judicial District Court for Humboldt County, 67 Nev. 318,

218 P. 2d 939 (1950) ; Hodous v. Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 36 N. W. 2d 554 (1949) ;
Bradshaw v. Bradsaw, 23 Tenn. App. 359, 133 S. W. 2d 617 (1939) ; De Younge
v. De
Younge, 103 Utah 410, 135 P. 2d 905 (1943).
H2 Ex parte Resner, 67 Cal. App. 2d 806, 155 P. 2d 667 (1945); State ex rel.
utchens v. District Court for Ravalli County, 122 Mont. 76, 199 P. 2d 272
(1948).
3 Robertson v. State. 20 Ala. App. 514, 104 So. 561, 575 (1925); Ex Parte
Gunnels, 25 Ala. App. 577, 151 So. 605 (1933).
"4State ex rel. Matheny, 188 Ore. 502, 216 P. 2d 270 (1950); State ex rel.
Blackwell v. Blackwell, 181 Ore. 157, 179 P. 2d 278 (1947).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently said that the
burden to "establish facts" is on the contemner when he seeks to purge
himself,15 but earlier statements by the court explained that a contempt
proceeding is properly begun by proof of facts constituting a prima
facie case which made it encumbent upon the contemner to answer, without specifying upon whom the burdens of proof or going forward
rested. 16 Under these decisions it appears that the procedure in North
Carolina is not greatly different from that of most other jurisdictions,
because the complainant must first prove a court order and failure to
obey it whereupon the contemner must satisfy the court of his inability
to comply.' 7
There are conflicting views as to the intensity of the evidence required to adjudge an individual in contempt for failure to comply with
a court order, and it is variously held: the evidence must be beyond a
reasonable doubt;18 a mere preponderance of the evidence is insuffici20
ent ;19 the evidence need be only of the greater weight.
A requisite to a valid contempt citation in North Carolina 2 1 and in
some other jurisdictions 22 is the appearance in the contempt order of a
finding upon proper facts that the contemner was able to comply with
the court order he disobeyed.
The most delicate problem arising in the application of the foregoing
rules of evidence is the effect to be given the contemner's sworn testimony or affidavit that he is unable to comply with the court order. If
" Hart Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Abrams, 231 N. C. 431, 439, 57 S. E. 2d 803, 809
(1950) : "The respondents [contemners] having sought to purge themselves, the
burden was on them to establish facts sufficient for that purpose."
In re Walker, 82 N. C. 96, 97 (1880) : "In cases of alleged contempt out
of the presence of the Court the practice is to have a foundation laid by facts
shown forth, by affidavit or otherwise, constituting a prima facie case, and then

by a rule to put the accused to show cause against the attachment by an
answer denying the alleged facts of which he had notice in the rule or on the
record, or excusing his conduct, or, where the gravamen of the charge rested on
intention, by a disavowal of the imputed purpose." See In re Moore, 63 N. C.
396 (1896).
" For a case where the contemner did not satisfy the court of his inability
after admitting the court order and failure to comply, see Smith v. Smith, 92
N. C. 304 (1885).
'" Robertson v. State, 20 Ala. App. 514, 104 So. 561 (1925).
" Ex parte Lande, 96 Cal. App. 2d 926, 216 P. 2d 909 (1950).
"0State ex rel. Attorney General v. Blackwell, 181 Ore. 157, 179 P. 2d 278
(1947).
"Contempt order was reversed because record failed to include facts showing ability to comply with court order: Berry v. Berry, 215 N. C. 339, 1 S. E. 2d
871 (1939) ; Vaughn v. Vaughn, 213 N. C. 189, 195 S. E. 351 (1938).
2
Loy v. Loy, 32 Tenn. App. 470, 479, 222 S. W. 2d 873, 878 (1949): "A
judgment of contempt must contain an affirmative finding of defendant's [contemner's] ability to pay." Accord: Ex parte Cardella, 47 Cal. App. 2d 329, 117
P. 2d 908 (1941) (Record failed to include facts revealing ability to comply, although it did recite such a finding.); Kinner v. Steg, 74 Idaho 382, 262 P. 2d
994 (1953); In re Burns, 83 Mont. 200, 271 Pac. 439 (1928); Osterweil v.
Osterweil, 133 N. J. Eq. 36, 29 A. 2d 868 (1943) ; De Younge v. De Younge, 103
Utah 410, 135 P. 2d 905 (1943).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

the testimony is uncontroverted some courts rule that it is controlling, 23
as did the court in the principal case, 24 and the contemner's affidavit has
even been held conclusive where the complainant had filed an affidavit
contradicting the contemner's testimonyY2 However, where the contemner fails to make a complete revelation of the circumstances causing
his inability,26 or even without this justification, 27 a contra view maintains that the court need not accept the contemner's uncontroverted testimony but may hold him in contempt. Of course, where there is conflicting evidence the issue of the contemner's inability is for the court
28

to determine.

In the situation where the contemner says he is unable to comply
with a court order, there is an obvious analogy to cases involving contempts for false swearing, for in both situations the court is required to
decide whether a witness's testimony is true. Although such a comparison is not often made, at least one court has punished a contemner
for false swearing rather than disobedience to a court order when he
untruthfully explained his inability to the court,29 thus indicating that
23 Banks v. Banks, 188 Ga. 181, 182, 3 S.E. 2d 717, 718 (1939): "If the evidence is uncontroverted that he [the contemner] is unable to comply with the

order . . . by reason of .

.

. inability, it is error to adjudge him in contempt."

Accord: Hansbrough v. State ex tel Pittman, 193 Miss. 467, 10 So. 2d 171
(1942) ; Lakewood Trust Co. v. Lawshane Co., Inc., 102 N. J. Eq. 270, 140 AtI.
334 (1928).
In Robertson v. Johnson, 210 Mo. App. 585, 243 S. W. 215 (1922), it was
said that the contemner's uncontroverted statement of inability made a prima
fade case for him in defense.
CQmpare the quotation from Lester v. Lester, 63 Ga. 356, 359 (1879), note

38 infra.
2

Accord: Lamm v. Lamm, 229 N. C. 248, 49 S. E. 2d 403 (1948).
Laff v. Laff, 161 Minn. 122, 200 N. W. 936 (1924).
"' Huddleston v. Huddleston, 189 Ga. 228, 5 S. E. 2d 896 (1939) (Contemner
failed to offer information as to an automobile that he owned.) ; Ekblad v. Ekblad,
207 Minn. 346, 291 N. W. 511 (1940)_ (Contemner produced no evidence as to
cost or records concerning contracts alleged to be in his possession.) ; Armijo
v. Armijo, 29 N. M. 15, 217 Pac. 623 (1923) (Contemner did not show the value
of real property that he owned.).
27 Meisner v. Meisner, 220 Minn. 559, 20 N. W. 2d 486 (1945).
8 State ex rel. Houtchins v. District Court for Ravalli County, 122 Mont. 76,
199 P. 2d 272 (1948) (Contemner showed he was unable to make alimony
payments pursuant to court decree because he was unemployed and without property, but other evidence revealed that the contemner was young and able to earn
income; hld in contempt.) ; Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 23 Tenn. App. 359, 133
S. W. 2d 617 (1939) (Contemner said he was unable to make alimony payments
as ordered because he had to support dependents, but it was proved that he had a
job or received unemployment insurance; held in contempt.); Razall v. Razall,
242 Wis. 121, 7 N. W. 2d 417 (1943) (Conflicting evidence as to contemner's
sickness causing his inability to comply; held not in contempt.).
"9Eykelboom v. People, 71 Colo. 318, 325, 206 Pac. 388, 390 (1922). Here the
contemner, an officer in a business in receivership, was ordered to produce letters
concerning the business, but said he was unable to comply because the letters had
"disappeared." In affirming a judgment of contempt the court said: "The falsity
of that justification appears from his own testimony. . . . It is the law that a
court has the right to punish as a contempt manifest perjury committed in its
presence, where the court knows, judicially and beyond doubt, that the testimony
is false."
2
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the analogy is not inappropriate. 30 It is hardly necessary to indicate
that the jurisdictions are not in accord on this subject. 31 One extreme
maintains that a single judge cannot find testimony to be false when
the witness denies the falsity of his statements. 32 A more frequently
applied rule holds that a court may adjudge a witness in contempt for
false swearing only when he admits his guilt, or the court through personal observation or judicial notice knows that the testimony is false,33
and some courts add requirements that the false answer must have a
directly obstructive effect and be pertinent to the issues.3 4 Another view
o See Robertson v. Johnson, 210 Mo. App. 585, 243 S. W. 215 (1922), where
despite court order the contemner failed to produce a diamond ring, explaining
that she had lost it at the theater, and the court held her uncontroverted statement prima facie purged her of contempt, stating: "To find her guilty of contempt
under those circumstances was equivalent to finding her guilty of perjury."
"Ex parte Holbrook, 133 Me. 276, 284, 177 AUt. 418, 422 (1935): "Innumerable citations might be added, but these suffice to illustrate the various positions
taken by the courts concerning the question under discussion. They may be divided into four groups: The first holding that perjury always constitutes contempt
and may be punished as such; the second, that certain other definite factors must
accompany perjury in order to make it a basis for contempt charges; the third,
that it is only when the presiding justice has judicial notice of the falsity of
the testimony that he may regard it as contempt and inflict summary punishment;
and the fourth, that a single justice is entirely without authority to make a finding
that perjury has been committe-d in any case under any circumstances and, on the
basis of such a finding, punish for contempt."
" People v. Richman, 222 Ill. App. 147 (1929) ; Ex parte Holbrook, 133 Me.
276, 177 Atl. 418 (1935) ; Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W. 914 (1912) ;
State v. Illario, 10 N. J. Super. 475, 77 A. 2d 483 (1950) (Recognizing an exception in special circumstances.).
"E : parte Blache, 40 Cal. App. 2d 687, 105 P. 2d 635 (1940) (judicial
knowledge); Wilder v. Sampson, 279 Ky. 103, 129 S. W. 2d 1022 (1939) (judicial
knowledge); Mclnnis v. State, 202 Miss. 715, 32 So. 2d 444 (1947) (personal
or judicial knowledge) ; Lopez v. Maes, 38 N. M. 524, 37 P. 2d 240 (1934)
(judicial knowledge).
The requirement that the court must have judicial knowledge of the falsity of
the contemner's testimony was carried to the extreme in Russell v. Field, 192
Ky. 262, 232 S. W. 475 (1921), when the contemner by signed affidavit had admitted his testimony was false but the appellate court said it was not within the
judicial knowledge of the trial court, reversing a judgment of contempt. A
contrary result was reached in People v. Katelhut, 322 Ill. App. 693, 54 N. E. 2d
590 (1944), where the contemner admitted his false testimony and it was held
that the trial court need not have personal knowledge of the falsity in such a case.
"4A frequently quoted statement of this view appears in Hegelaw v. State,
24 Ohio. App. 103, -, 155 N. E. 620, 621 (1927) : "To justify a finding of guilty of
contempt . . . the following elements must subsist: (1) That the alleged false
answer had an obstructive effect. (2) Judicial knowledge of the falsity of the
testimony. (3) The question must be pertinent to the issue." Accord: Hunder
v. Gordon, 111 Colo. 234, 140 P. 2d 622 (1943) ; State ex rel. Luban v. Coleman,
138 Fla. 555, 189 So. 713 (1939).
Compare the rigid requirements set out in People v. Hille, 192 Ill. App. 141.
147 (1915) : ". . . it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt from the personal
knowledge of the court, or be admissions from the lips of the defendant himself in
open court, and in the presence of the court, and from no other source whatsoever, that (1) the representations so made were false and untrue when made;
(2) that the defendant knew of their falsity when he made them, and (3) that
he made them knowing their falsity and with a wilful and malevolent intention of
assailing the dignity of the court or of interfering with its procedure and the
due administration of justice.
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indicates that a witness may be held in contempt if all the evidence
indicates his testimony is inherently false,35 and the federal rule is similar
to this, but requires that the perjury actually obstruct the court.30
Similar to the principal case are proceedings in bankruptcy or receivership where a contemner is ordered to turn over business records,
property or money, and he attempts to excuse his failure to comply by
showing that he does not possess the articles he is ordered to produce.
The United States Supreme Court has said that the trial court has power
to determine whether there is a present ability to comply with its order
and may discount denials which it finds "incredible in context."3T Our
highest court indicates that a plea of inability "is given credit after
demonstration that a period in prison does not produce the goods,"' 8 a
procedure that bears some similarity to medieval trial by ordeal. After
applying this rule, one state court found that a denial of the possession
of inventory records was "incredible in context" since the contemner
had previously said he possessed the records. 39 Earlier cases in state
courts held the contemner's explanation insufficient where he said he
lost a roll of bills worth $18,000 while "bird hunting in Norfolk County
[Virginia],"40 or that important letters had simply "disappeared. '41
While these cases did not restrict their holdings to contempts arising in
insolvency proceedings, other courts have said that there is a duty on
the contemner making a plea of inability to disclose completely his
"Re Gitkin 164 Fed. 71 (E. D. Pa. 1908) ; Crumnal v. K. L. R. Realty Corporation, 265 App. Div. 22, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 645 (1942) (Court said it was clear from
all evidence that contemner's testimony was false.). See EX parte Blache, 40 Cal.
App. 2d 687, , 105 P. 2d 635, 637 (1940) ; Hunder v. Gordon, 111 Colo. 234,
240, 140 P. 2d 622, 624 (1943).
" U. S. v. McGovern, 60 F. 2d 880 (2d Cir. 1932). Ex parte Hudgings, 249
U. S. 378 (1919), makes clear the requirement that false testimony must obstruct
the court before it is punishable as contempt. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S.
56 (1948), note 37 insfra, and discussion of the Maggio case in the text infra.
"Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56, 76 (1948).
3
Id. at 76. An earlier, similar statement is found in Lester v. Lester, 63 Ga.
356, 359 (1879): "We cannot say that the judge, under the circumstances, abused
his authority in not accepting the respondent's answer as satisfactory, and in
ordering an attachment for contempt. The attachment will bring the actual resources of the respondent to a practical and decisive test. Pressure is a great concentrator and developer of force. Under the stress of an attachment, even the
vision of the respondent himself may be cleared and brightented [sic.], so that he
will discern ways and means which were once hidden from him, or seen obscurely.
It is a great help to a thing to feel that it must be done, and that there is no
evading it. Harsh as was the old remedy of imprisonment for debt, it had this
wholesome effect in many cases, and was, so far, a beneficial instrumentality. While
the imprisonment which impends over the respondent is not for debt, it can be prevented by the same means as if it were; that is, by payment."
" Dishinger v. Bon Aire Catering, Inc., 336 Ill.
App. 557, 84 N. E. 2d 562
(1949) (receivership).
" Drake v. National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, 168 Va. 230, 190 S. E.
302 (1937) (Money was insurance proceeds paid to a business in receivership.).
"Eykelboom v. People, 71 Colo. 318, 206 Pac. 388 (1922) (Letters were connected with business which had gone into recievership.) See note 29 supra.
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financial condition when it is peculiarly within his knowledge, 42 thus
revealing added justification for the insolvency decisions.
The typical case where inability is raised as a defense involves the
husband who fails to make alimony or support payments. 43 He may
prove his inability to comply by showing that he is without money, owns
no property and does not receive sufficient income to make the ordered
payments to hs wife due to sickness, 44 injury4 5 or business difficulties. 46
In some jurisdictions it is not necessary to justify the inadequacy of the
husband's income, for these courts evidently secure to the divorced husband the "unalienable right to starve to death" when it is said they are
without power to compel an individual to work.47 There is authority
very much in conflict with this view, adjudging the husband in contempt when he failed to take the highest paying job available, but accepted employment which paid a lower salary but offered an interest in
the capital, 48 or paid the husband in the form of free room and board.49
Certainly a court order to produce evidence is not "an invitation to
a game of hare and hounds" but an implement necessary to the administration of justice; on the other hand, the colorful observation that
"the devil himself knoweth not the mind of man" indicates that
courts are properly reluctant to determine summarily the truth of a contemner's testimony. Granting the propriety of broad powers in the
court to protect its processes against those who do not respect them, the
writer believes some protection should be afforded the individual. Accordingly, where an individual has failed to comply with a court order
but professes his inability to obey it, it is suggested that the better policy
under constitutional safeguards would require that there be evidence
tendered to the court, or facts within the court's personal knowledge,

showing the individual's testimony to be untrue, or that his inability
resulted from his own misconduct or "contumacious" acts.
Roy W. DAVIs, JR.
State ex rel. Blackwell v. Blackwell, 181 Ore. 157, 164, 179 P. 2d 278, 281
(1947) : "The financial condition of defendant was a matter peculiarly within his
own knowledge, and, when charged with failure to comply with the decree of the
court as to payment of money, it was incumbent upon him, if seeking to excuse
his failure to make payments, to make a full and complete disclosure of the facts
showing his inability to pay." See Laff v. Laff, 161 Minn. 122, 200 N. W. 936
(1924).
"In Ex parte Risner, 67 Cal. App. 2d 806, 155 P. 2d 667 (1945), a contempt
judgment was upheld in habeas corpus proceedings, where a wife had failed to
comply with a court decree ordering her to make alimony payments to her
husband. Is this a straw in the wind?
"Razall v. Razall, 242 Wis. 121, 7 N. W. 2d 417 (1943).
"Caffrey v. Caffrey, 4 F. 2d 952 (D. C. Cir. 1925)_.
O Chong v. Chong, 35 Hawaii 541 (1940).
,7 Id. at 544: "This conclusion is in harmony with the authorities which do
not recognize the right of a court in cases of this kind to control a man's economic
ventures, although insistent that if he is able he shall obey the orders of the court."
R Osmers v. Osmers, 114 Utah 216, 198 P. 2d 233 (1948).
"State ex rel. Houtchens v. District Court for Ravalli County, 122 Mont. 76,
199 P. 2d 272 (1948).
4
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Torts-Insulating Negligence in North Carolina
"Any effort to reconcile the North Carolina law on the subject of
insulating negligence seems futile."' A study of the North Carolina cases
on this subject at best leads one to agree with the somewhat kinder
criticism of Chief 2Justice Stacy that the problem "is usually fraught with
some knottiness."
The practicing attorney faces the problem of insulating negligence
when his client has received injury at the hands of two negligent parties.
The first party (hereafter referred to as the first tortfeasor) in most
cases has by his nonfeasance created a possible danger to the plaintiff,
e.g., emission of proper safeguards to warn of obstructions in the road.
In other cases the first tortfeasor may have caused injury to the plaintiff as a result of his active negligence, e.g., excessive speed. The
second negligent party (hereafter referred to as the "insulator") is invariably guilty of active negligence and his negligence is second in point
of time.
In a typical fact situation, the first tortfeasor abandons a stalled
vehicle on the highway at night, without adequate flares. The insulator,
with plaintiff as a passenger, travels at an excessive rate of speed and
fails to see the stalled vehicle in time to avoid a collision. Even though
both parties are negligent and both therefore wrong the plaintiff, the
probable result in North Carolina would be insulation of the negligence
of the first tortfeasor by the negligence of the insulator, and consequent
release of the first torifeasor from liability to the plaintiff. Thus, unfortunately for the injured plaintiff, a party contributing to his injury
is relieved of liability.
It would of couse be unrealistic to expect the law to be so well defined that an attorney could look at a set of facts and tell at a glance
whether the court will rule that the negligence of the first tortfeasor is
insulated, but it is contended that an attorney should be able to predict
with reasonable certainty which rationale the court will pursue. Therefore, it is the purpose of this note to resolve to some degree of predictability the course of reasoning which the court will follow in a given
set of operative facts.
Cases of Passive Negligence on the Part of the First Torfeasor and
Active Negligence on the Part of the Insulator
Clearly the most lenient case for the plaintiff who is attempting to
hold the first tortfeasor for damages was the early case of White v.
Carolina Realty Co.,3 where the first tortfeasor's truck was negligently
1 Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 699 (E. D. N. C. 1954).
2 Butner v. Spease, 217 N. C. 82, 85, 6 S. E. 2d 808, 810 (1940).
182 N. C. 536, 109 S. E. 564 (1921).
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parked at an intersection. - There was evidence of fog and also evidence
of negligence on the part of the alleged insulator, who, with plaintiff a
passenger, collided with the first tortfeasor's truck. The court held
that the first tortfeasor could not be released from liability "if any degree, however small, of the causal negligence, or that without which the
injury would not have occurred, be attributable to the defendant . . .
because the defendant cannot be excused from liability unless the total
causal negligence, or proximate cause be attributable to another or
others." 4 This case is often quoted and was held controlling in two early
cases.8 Although the court has ceased to be this liberal, it has required that the trial court must charge the jury that the second actor's
negligence must totally supersede the negligence of the first tortfeasor
as the proximate cause of injury in order to insulate, relying on the
White case as the authority.6
It is submitted that the court reached the logical result in the White
case in that it would not allow "two wrongs to make a right" by refusing to release the first tortfeasor from liability to the plaintiff. However, on facts similar to the White case-(1) the evidence revealing
that the first tortfeasor has by his nonfeasance created a possible danger
to the plaintiff, and (2) there being no evidence that ths peril was
recognized by the insulator or any other party similarly situated as the
insulator-the court has in the majority of the later cases insulated the
first tortfeasor's passive negligence and deemed the insulator's conduct active negligence subsequently operating. To understand this
position it is necessary to review the line of decisions giving rise to this
rationale.
In Herman v. Atlantc Coast Line R.R.,7 where the plaintiff's evidence of the speed of the insulator's automobile revealed that his negligence was gross and palpable, the court introduced the works of Wharton
on Negligence8 as being pertinent: "I am negligent on a particular
subject matter. Another person, moving independently, comes in and,
either negligently or maliciously, so acts as to make my negligence injurious to a third person. If so, the person so intervening acts as a
Id. at 538, 109 S. E. at 565.

Earwood v. Southern Ry., 192 N. C. 27, 30, 133 S. E. 180, 181 (1926) (evisignals at railroad crossing; insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of excessive speed); Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 431,' 130 S. E. 5, 6 (1925) .(first
tortfeasor left culvert open, unguarded, and without warning lights; insulator, with
plaintiff a passenger, guilty of excessive speed).
' Rattley v. Powell, 223 N. C. 134, 136, 25 S. E. 2d 448, 450 (1943) ; Hanes v.
Southern Public Utilities Co., 191. N. C. 13, 19, 131 S. E. 402, 405 (1926).
1197 N. C. 718, 150 S. E. 361 (1929) (First tortfeasor was a railroad company. There was omission of warning signals at crossing. Insulator's car, with
plaintiff a passenger skidded 90 feet before the collision and plaintiff's own witness testified it "hit and reared up like a bucking horse"')
8WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE 138 (1874).

dence of excessive speed of first tortfeasor's locomotive and evidence of no warning
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nonconductor and insulates my negligence. . . ." The court also quoted
from the opinion of Justice Strong in the leading United States Supreme
Court case of Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg' ° as applying the
same rule, seemingly emphasizing Justice Strong's requirement of a
definite causal connection, without comment on his oft-quoted requirement that the injury "ought to have been foreseen in the light of the
12
attending circumstances."". In Hinnant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
the Herman case was cited as standing for the rule that the first tortfeasor is not required to foresee the negligence of the insulator where
the latter's negligence in palpable and gross.' 3 Subsequently, the
Herman and Hinnant cases were used as authority for the cryptic statement, "In any event, the negligence of the defendant [first tortfeasor] if
any, was only passive, while that of the driver of the automobile [insulator] was active, and must be regarded as the sole, proximate cause
of the plaintiff's intestate's death."'14 The court in Haney v. Lincolnton'5
gave Wharton and Justice Strong as the authorities on insulating negligence without extra comment and actually decided the case with the
statement: "This doctrine of insulating the conduct of one, even when
it amounts to inactive negligence, by the intervention of the active negligence of a responsible third party, has been applied in a number of
cases,"' 16 and cited the above line of cases. The Haney case set the
stage for the pat decisions that where the negligence of the first tortfeasor was passive and would have done no injury to the plaintiff but
for the subsequent active act of the insulator, the first tortfeasor's negligence is insulated. In these cases, the court quotes from Wharton and
Strong, but gives only cursory reference, if any, to the latter authority's
requirement of foreseeability.17
'Herman v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., supra note 7 at 719, 150 S.E. at 362.
1

94 U. S. 469, 475 (1876).

1

2Ibid.
12202 N. C. 489, 493, 163 S.E. 555, 557 (1932) (first tortfeasor a railroad company; visible railroad crossing sign at top of hill; no warning signals of approaching train; insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of excessive speed).
"2Rattley v. Powell, 223 N. C. 134, 136, 25 S.E. 2d 448, 450 (1943) expressly
overruled any inference that might be drawn from the Herman case, slepra note 7,
that the negligence of the insulator must be palpable and gross in order to insulate
the first tortfeasor's negligence.
"4Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. RL, 205 N. C. 329, 333, 171 S.E. 342, 344
(1933) (first tortfeasor a railroad company, negligence consisted of failure to light
stone pillar in middle of underpass beneath railroad's tracks; insulator asleep at
wheel with plaintiff a passenger).
1 207 N. C. 382, 176 S. E. 573 (1934) (first tortfeasor a municipality, negligently
failed to light intersection to show where street ended; insulator, with plaintiff a
passenger, failed to make proper turn and went into ravine at end of street) ; Note,
13 N. C. L. Rzv. 245 (1935).
"Id. at 287, 176 S. E. at 576.
'
Goodwin v. Nixon, 236 N. C. 632, 642, 74 S. E. 2d 24, 31 (1953) ; Clark v.
Lambeth, 235 N. C. 578, 584, 70 S. E. 2d 828, 832 (1952); Smith v. Sink, 211
N. C. 725, 728, 192 S. E. 108, 109 (1937).
T
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Three cases which fall into this category but where the foreseeability
rationale was applied can possibly be distinguished upon the facts. In
Beach v. Patton,I8 the plaintiff was standing on the shoulder of the road
when hit by the insulator. There the court reasoned that "to hold that
the defendant Riddick [first tortfeasor] owed the duty to plaintiff's intestate to foresee that a third person would operate a car in such a negligent manner as to be compelled to drive out onto the shoulder of the
highway in order to avoid a collision with a car [first tortfeasor's]
parked on the opposite side thereof, [italics supplied] and thereby strike
a person standing on the shoulder would not only 'practically stretch
foresight into omniscience' . . . but would, in effect, require the anticipation of 'whatsoever shall come to pass.' We apprehend that the legal
principles by which individuals are held liable for their negligent acts
impose no such far-seeing and all-inclusive duty."'19 In the other two
cases where the theory of the Haney case was not applied,2 0 the first
tortfeasor had clearly by his nonfeasance created a hazard. There were
no lights or warnings of any kind and no conclusive evidence that other
persons similarly situated as the insulator had seen the hazard. It was
held that injury under such circumstances was foreseeable and the first
tortfeasor was not released from liability. It is suggested that the facts
of these two cases were such that injury was not merely foreseeable but
was most probable.
The court has invariably approved insulation where the circumstances reveal that a person similarly situated as the insulator has recognized the possible danger, and the insulator, for such reasons as failure
to keep a proper lookout, negligently attempting to pass, or excessive
speed, failed to recognize the danger in time to avoid the collision. In
the leading case on this type of collision, Powers v. Sternberg,21 Chief
Justice Stacy drew on a Pennsylvania case 22 for his authority: "Where
a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger
created by the original torifeasor, and thereafter by an independent act
of negligence, brings about an accident, the first tortfeasor is relieved of
liability, because the condition created by him was merely a circum18208

N. C. 134, 179 S. E. 446 (1935).

LOId. at 136, 179 S. E. at 448.
"Price v. City of Monroe, 234 N. C. 666, 6 S. E. 2d 283 (1951) (first tortfeasor had no lights whatsoever to warn of open ditch across city street; insulator,

with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of failure to keep a proper lookout) ; Gold. v.
Kiker, 216 N. C. 511, 5 S. E. 2d 548 (1939) (first tortfeasor a construction company; omission of duty to warn by lights that bridge was 4 feet narrower than
highway; insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, guilty of failure to keep a proper

lookout).

21213 N. C. 41, 195 S. E. 88 (1938) (The first tortfeasor's truck was parked
partially in the insulator's line of traffic. The road was icy and there were several other cars parked off the highway on the shoulder of the road. The insulator,

With plaintiff a passenger, was guilty of excessive speed.)
"Kline
v. Moyer and Albert, 325 Pa. 357, 364, 191 Atl. 43, 46 (1937).
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stance of the accident and not its proximate cause."
This requirement
does not seem to be one of actual awareness but constructive knowledge
is sufficient-"Every appearance indicated that he was running into a
zone of danger which he [the insulator] must have seen. Others saw
it, if he did not." 24 Therefore, "His was not the 'normal response' of a
reasonably prudent' man to the circumstances as they appeared." 2 The
ultimate issue in these cases seems to be the court's interpretation of the
duty owed to the plaintiff. If the evidence reveals that the danger
created by the first tortfeasor has been recognized by a person in a
similar position as the insulator, then the first tortfeasor's duty to the
plaintiff is fullfilled because the insulator is in a sense contructively aware
of the danger and can cause injury to the plaintiff only by an independent
26
act of negligence.
Where it is clear that the insulator has become actually aware of the
potential danger caused by the first tortfeasor and has then negligently
gone forward into the recognized zone of danger, the court has sustained
a demurrer, 27 or entered a nonsuit on the pleadings, 2 even before the
Sternberg case.
Where there was no evidence of gross negligence on the part of the
insulator or no evidence that a person similarly situated as the insulator
recognized the possible peril, or no evidence that the insulator recognized
the danger and then negligently went forward into the zone of danger,
the court has applied the doctrine of concurrent negligence. This was
the view taken by a federal court in North Carolina,2 9 relying on the
following principle from Caulder v. Gresham:30 "Where the second actor
does not become apprised of such danger until his own negligence added
Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N. C. 41, 44, 195 S. E. 88, 90 (1938).
2,
Id. at 43, 195 S. E. at 89.
25
Id. at 44, 195 S.E. at 90.
21 Smith v. Grubb, 238 N. C. 665, 78 S. E. 2d 598 (1953) ; McLaney v. Motor
Freight Inc., 236 N. C. 714, 74 S. E. Zd 36 (1953) (The first tortfeasor's truck
was parked in insulator's line of traffic. Insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, was
following a preceding vehicle too closely and failed to see the parked truck after
the preceding vehicle pulled out to the left to avoid hitting the parked truck.) ;
Reeves v. Staley, 220 N. C. 573, 584, 18 S. E. 2d 239, 247 (1942) ("Further, the
evidence shows that every appearance indicates that Saxton [insulator] was running his Ford into a zone of danger which he should have seen, and which others
similarly situated did see, if he did not, and that he failed to see the obvious.");
Murray v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N. C. 392, 11 S.E. 2d 326 (1940).
:7 Peoples v. Fulk, 220 N. C. 635, 18 S. E. 2d 147 (1942).
'George v. Atlanta and Charlotte Airline Ry., 207 N. C. 457, 177 S. E. 324
(1934) (The complaint alleged in effect that upon observing the oncoming locomotive, the insulator then negligently attempted to cross the tracks.) ; Ballinger
v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928).
"9Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 699 (E. D. N. C. 1954)
(First tortfeasor parked mail truck in insulator's line of traffic with improper
flares. Insulator, with plaintiff a passenger, did not see the mail truck in time
to avoid colliding with it. There was no conclusive evidence of excessve speed
on the part of the insulator.)
-- 224 N. C. 402, 404, 30 S. E. 2d 312, 313 (1944).
2
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to that of the existing perilous condition, has made the accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the two tortfeasors are contributing causes and
proximate factors in the happening of the accident and impose liability
upon both of the guilty parties."
Cases of Active Negligence on the Partof Both the First Tortfeasorand
the Insulator
A typical example of the cases where both parties are actively negligent is where the first torifeasor is traveling at excesive speed and
the insulator suddenly comes out of a side road without stopping at a
stop sign. The court is more apt to emphasize the foreseeability aspect
of insulating negligence in such situations. The leading case on the
requisite of foreseeability is Harton v. Forest City Telephone Co.31 where
the "test ... is whether the intervening act and resultant injury is one
that the author of the primary negligence could have reasonably foreseen and expected.13 2 This test plus the application of Justice Strong's
ruling in the Kellogg case resulted in the holding of Butner v. Spease: 3
"It does not appear that the collision ... was the natural and probable
consequence of Butner's [first torifeasor] negligence, or wrongful act, or
that it ought to have been foreseen in the exercise of reasonable prevision
or in the light of the attending circumstances."3 4 In the Butner case
the insulator suddenly turned across the path 'of the automobile of the
first tortfeasor, whose negligence consisted of excessive speed. The
Butner case has also been relied upon for overruling the requirement
that the insulator's negligent conduct must be palpable and gross, "the
test is not to be found merely in the degree of negligence of the intervening agency, but in its character-whether it is of such extraordinary
nature as to be unforeseeable." 35'
This foreseeability doctrine was applied again in Warnerv. Lazarus,3 6
"In the light of the circumstances disclosed by this record, we do not
think the driver of the Lazarus car [first tortfeasor] 'ought to have foreseen in the exercise of reasonable prevision' that the plaintiff or some
other person might be injured as a result and probable consequence of
her act in slowing down her car."' 7
-1 141 N. C. 455, 54 S. E. 299 (1906).
"Id. at 463, 54, S. E. at 302.
33217
N. C. 82, 6 S. E. 2d 808 (1940).
3 Id. at 89, 6 S. E. 2d at 812.
" Rattley v. Powell, 223 N. C. 134, 136, 25 S. E. 2d 448, 450 (1943). See
note 13 supra.
- 229 N. C. 27, 47 S. E. 2d 496 (1948) (The first tortfeasor slowed down
rapidly as she approached a parked car where plaintiff was changing a tire. The
plaintiff and his car were completely off the highway. The insulator was following
the first tortfeasor. The insulator's regular brakes were defective and he applied
his handbrakes to avoid hitting the first tortfeasor, thus skidding off the highway
into the plaintiff.)
3T Id. at 31, 47 S. E. 2d at 499, relying on Butner v. Spease, supra note 33;
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It can be said that, as to the collision between two active tortfeasors,
the court will very probably rely upon the foreseeability doctrine of
Butner v. Spease and insulate the negligence of the first tortfeasor if the
negligence of the insulator is so extraordinary as to be unforeseeable, or
if the negligence of the first tortfeasor would not reasonably of itself
tend to bring harm to the plaintiff or others.
Where the negligence of the first tortfeasor has continued to be a
causal factor in the ultimate injury to the plaintiff, i.e., beyond the point
of the original collision (between the two tortfeasors), the court has
arrived at refreshing consistency in holding that the first tortfeasor is
not relieved from liability to the plaintiff,88 reasoning that "the superseding act must so intervene as to exclude the negligence of the defendant [first tortfeasor] as one of the proximate causes of the injury." 39 Therefore if it can be shown that the first tortfeasor's negligence, i.e., excessive speed, failure of brakes or other essential safeguards, was the proximate factor in the first tortfeasor failure to avert
further injury to the plaintiff after the initial collision, it is reasonably
safe to assume that the first tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff will not
be insulated.
It is submitted that the court's variance in rationale will not permit
an ascertainable rule which will apply to every situation in determining
insulation, 40 although it does reach a reasonable degree of consistency
when the decisions are viewed in the light of similar factual situations.
In the cases of passive negligence on the part of the first tortfeasor, and
active negligence on the part of the insulator, the court will very probably insulate the passive negligent act, relying upon either (1) the reasoning of the Haney decision that the passive negligence would have done
accord, Loving v. Whitton, 241 N. C. 273, 84 S. E. 2d 919 (1955) (First tortfeasor did not have to foresee that the insulator would fail to stop at stop sign.) ;
cf. Hollifield v. Everhart, 237 N. C. 313, 74 S. E. 2d 706 (1953) (failure to frame
adequate causal relationship in the complaint).
" Alridge v. Hasty, 240 N. C. 353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954) (The insulator
turned across the path of the first tortfeasor's vehicle. After the initial impact,

the first tortfeasor's vehicle because of excessive speed veered across the road,
travelled down a ditch, jumped an embankment and struck the plaintiff.) ; Dickson
v. Queen City Coach Co. and Chappell v. Queen City Coach Co., 233 N. C. 167,
63 S. E. 2d 297 (1951) (After the initial impact, the first tortfeasor's bus, with
plaintiffs as passengers, veered across the highway and down an eight foot
embankment. There was evidence that the driver could have stopped the bus by
proper application of the hand brake.) ; accord, Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines and
Breeze v. Akers Motor Lines, 233 N. C. 160, 63 S. E. 2d 197 (1951) ; Mangum v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 188 N. C. 689, 125 S. E. 549 (1924).
"Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines and Breeze v. Akers Motor Lines, supra note 38
at 165, 63 S. E. 2d at 200.
,'Blair, Automobile Accidents in North Carolina, 23 N. C. L. REy. 223, 242
(1945) attributes to Justice Seawell this observation about North Carolina's experience in the field of insulating negligence: "the vacillation of the court . . .
reminded him of the man who said his prayer was 'Lord, give me this day my daily
opinion and forgive me the one I had yesterday.'"
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no injury to the plaintiff but for the subsequent active and independent
act of the insulator, or (2) the constructive knowledge requirement of
Powers v. Sternberg. Where both the first tortfeasor and the insulator
are guilty of active negligence, the court very probably apply the foreseeability reasoning of Butner v. Spease and insulate the first torifeasor's
active negligent conduct if the act of the insulator is so extraordinary
as to be unforeseeable.
And yet, why the different tests for determining liability? Is it not
just as logical that a party parking his car on the highway without lights
should be charged with a duty to foresee that an injury might occur as
it is to charge a party guilty of excessive speed with the duty of foreseeability ?
We proceed upon two well founded principles of law; one, foreseeability is an essential element in determining proximate cause; and,
two, a negligent actor is liable for injury where his negligence is one
of the proximate causes of such injury. The court says, in effect, that
in order for the first tortfeasor to be relieved of liability to the plaintiff,
his negligence must be insulated as to the proximate cause of the injury.
We, therefore, arrive at the logical conclusion that in order for the first
tortfeasor's negligence to be insulated as a proximate causal factor in
the injury to the plaintiff, the alleged insulating act must be an unforeseeable act. Yet our review of the decisions has shown the foreseeability
principle omitted in some cases, paid mere lip service in others, and
emphasized as the test primarily where both the first tortfeasor and
the insulator are actively negligent, but even then confined, in the main,
to cases where the acts of the insulator were of extraordinary nature.
It is submitted, therefore, that the requisite of foreseeability should
be the test in a1l cases of insulating negligence.
HERBERT H. Tiaop.

